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ABSTRACT 
 
This submission for PhD by Publication includes two studies I conducted during 
8 years of dedicated field research examining the US role in mediating the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  These studies developed from my collection of in-depth 
oral testimonies and were buttressed by my recovery and examination of troves 
of original documents that had been previously denied any public, much less 
academic, scrutiny.  The scope of this qualitative research and my political and 
historical analysis of it resulted in two published books that chronicle the 
unsuccessful American efforts to negotiate Arab-Israeli peace agreements 
during the presidencies of William Clinton, George W. Bush, and the first term 
of Barack Obama. In order of publication, they are The Truth About Camp David 
(New York: Nation Books, 2004) and The Palestine Papers: The End of the 
Road? (London: Hesperus Press, 2011).  
 
The original academic contribution of both works was the presentation of new 
empirical evidence to advance understanding of how heavily biased American 
mediation severely damaged this diplomatic undertaking.  Despite being a 
solidly pro-Israel country, the United States had previously been able to achieve 
some notable mediation successes when it made efforts to adopt an “even-
handed” approach.   Yet in the period covered by both my books, I 
demonstrated how top American mediators—comprised of mostly pro-Israel 
partisans—dismissed any pretext of impartiality, and in most instances even 
escalated their mediation bias.  This behavior has exacerbated the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and made the stated aim of a comprehensive peace a very distant 
prospect.   
 
The Truth About Camp David was intended as a first rough draft of history.  The 
title references the famous summit convened by President Clinton in July 2000 
that failed to forge peace between Israelis and Palestinians and the overarching 
US-led “peace process” around it which contributed to the outbreak of the 
Second Intifada. The book also details the effort to conclude an Israeli-Syrian 
peace agreement at Geneva just months before, which also failed.   My 
research advanced the thesis that both the Geneva and Camp David summits 
were historic miscarriages of diplomacy by my presentation of granular insider 
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accounts revealing the intensity of American mediation bias.  I also exposed the 
general disorganization of its negotiating team, a dysfunction that was largely 
unknown to the public prior to my book’s release.  
 
My primary purpose in writing The Truth About Camp David was thus to enable 
its reinterpretation by making public new evidence about this watershed 
moment and the period surrounding it.  Relying primarily on oral history, I 
interviewed US, Arab, Israeli and European officials who were first-hand 
participants to collect their personal narratives.  I sought to identify 
discrepancies in their accounts, and attempted to reconcile them through further 
interviews, document interrogation, and my own analysis.  A key challenge of 
The Truth About Camp David was thus to weave a thread through the various 
testimonies and present, as best as I could, a coherent historical narrative.  
Following that, my aim was to have it reviewed and discussed among credible 
scholars and the foreign policy community.  The testimonies within The Truth 
About Camp David directly challenged the official narrative and prevailing media 
orthodoxy at the time of Palestinian blame and Syrian intransigence. As a 
result, it helped reframe both political debate and academic scholarship 
concerning this crucial period of American diplomatic intervention.1  In 2006, 
The Truth About Camp David was translated into Arabic, giving its contents 
even greater reach.   
 
My 2011 book “The Palestine Papers:  The End of the Road?” continued my 
earlier line of inquiry and was largely based on documents given to me the year 
prior, referred to as “The Palestine Papers,” the largest leak of confidential 
negotiating records in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Published in full by 
Al Jazeera Media Network, and in limited partnership with the UK’s Guardian 
newspaper, the content of the files generated headlines around the world from 
January 24-27, 2011.  My additional research for The Palestine Papers was 
released in May 2011 as an anthology of select papers with my accompanying 
qualitative analysis and interpretation rather than a stylistic mediation critique.  
My aim in writing “The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road?” publication was 
                                                        
1 A comprehensive list of reviews and citations of both books are included in the 
Appendix to this essay.   
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to reach beyond Al Jazeera and Guardian audiences and equip interested 
scholars, practitioners, and skeptics with essential highlights from the papers as 
well as an analytical framework to put them into context.  
 
My research for The Palestine Papers sought to help reconcile the intervening 
gap of negotiating history from Truth About Camp David, following the trajectory 
of how Israelis and Palestinians alike had grown even more conditioned to 
expect if not rely upon biased American mediation that excessively tilts toward 
Israel.  The Palestine Papers also catalogues for the first time the dynamics that 
enabled US negotiators to escalate its role from being the self-appointed judge 
of Palestinian negotiating behavior during the talks (in the Camp David 2000 
era) to the unilateral “juror” of its final-status positions (evidenced by the 
presidencies of George W Bush and Barack Obama).   
 
A supplemental essay included in this submission analyzes an earlier diplomatic 
era to advance my thesis of how far US mediation bias has traveled since 
America assumed the principal negotiator role of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 
early 1970’s.  Indeed, based on the overarching narrative that evolve from both 
those publications and this essay, it is entirely predictable to see how America’s 
mediation posture has matured into the era of extreme pro-Israel bias that now 
characterizes the approach of the Trump Administration.      
 
I will interpret this collective diplomatic history using a range of multidisciplinary 
academic theories addressing biased mediation in international conflict 
resolution.  Then, by drawing on the scholarship from my previous books, I will 
assess and critique the theoretical benefits of employing biased mediators in 
conflict resolution—as some prominent scholars have advocated for.  By taking 
a fresh look at earlier Arab-Israeli negotiations led by Henry Kissinger under 
President’s Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, I am able to make even greater 
contrast to that very limited era when biased American mediation in the Arab-
Israeli conflict appeared to yield limited success.  The process of applying the 
scholarship of others against the knowledge created from my own published 
works enable me to demonstrate in this essay that the present day American 
negotiating bias toward Israel largely exceeds what the normative scholarship 
on mediation bias envisaged.  
5 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Title Page:  RISE OF THE PARTISANS     1 
Abstract         2 
Table of Contents        5 
List of Accompanying Material      6 
Note on Style and Spelling       7 
Genesis of the Submitted Publications and Research                        8 
Introduction         15 
 
PART I: SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON MEDIATION MODELS  17 
 
1.1 Research Background       17 
1.2 Primer on International Mediation      17 
1.3 Unbiased/Impartial and Biased/Partial Mediator s   20 
1.4 More Royal Than the King & Bias Countermeasures   25 
1.5 Beware the Biased Mediator       25 
1.6 Leadership Selection Intervention     27 
 
PART II: FROM “BIASED BUT EVENHANDED” TO “ISRAEL’S LAWYER” 29 
 
2.1Kissinger As Biased But Evenhanded     29 
2.2 Observations on Kissinger’s Mediation Bias    40 
2.3 Escalating US Mediation Bias from Clinton to Obama   41 
2.4 Biased Mediator or “Israel’s Lawyer”?     50 
 
PART III: CONCLUSIONS        56 
3.1 Neither Honest Broker, Nor Effective Broker    56 
3.2 Trump and the Era of the Extremist Mediator    67 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY         74 
 Press With Byline        74 
 Press Without Byline       76 
 Books          77 
 Academic Articles        80 
 Archives         81 
 Videos         82  
 Speeches         82 
 
 
ANNEX                    83 
  
 Reviews of The Truth About Camp David    83 
 Citations of The Truth About Camp David    84 
 Citations of The Palestine Papers                91 
  
6 
 
LIST OF ACCOMPANYING MATERIAL 
 
Swisher, Clayton. The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road?. London:  
Hesperus Press, 2011.  Introduction: Dr Ghada Karmi (Exeter University); 
pages: 319. 
 
Swisher, Clayton. The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the 
Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process. New York: Nation Books, 2004; 
pages: 455.  
 
  
7 
 
NOTE ON STYLE AND SPELLING 
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Palestine Papers: The End of the Road? will simply be referenced as “The 
Palestine Papers”. 
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GENESIS OF THE SUBMITTED PUBLICATIONS AND RESEARCH 
 
When I set out to write The Truth About Camp David, much of the world’s mind 
seemed made up on the subject.  The prevailing view in the West was that 
Arabs were overwhelmingly to blame for the breakdown of diplomacy—whether 
it be Palestinians at Camp David in July 2000 or the Syrians at Geneva and 
Shepherdstown just a few months prior.  An outspoken group of US and Israeli 
officials with a vested interest had seemed to emerge as the predominate 
narrators of “what really happened” in the early 2000’s as the entire Oslo peace 
process went up in the flames of a bloody Second intifada (and later, subsumed 
by the September 11th attacks and the global response to it).  However hard 
these ex-officials tried, immunity from rigorous inspection would not prove 
lasting.  In defiance of the adage “history is written by the victors,” the 
ubiquitous “Arab blame” narrative would piecemeal fall apart.  Eyewitnesses 
uncomfortable with that deceit were bound to go public—and ultimately did.   
 
It was by strange circumstances my research would play a part in enabling that.  
I had been a U.S. special agent assigned to the protective detail of Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright during the Camp David summit and other international 
venues shortly thereafter in support of this so-called peace process.  In 2003, 
as a former bodyguard, I relied on my inferences and observations from that 
period to initiate a study on the subject, and later, an investigation, and finally, 
in 2004, publication of The Truth About Camp David, a heavily footnoted 405-
page book.  One line of inquiry I reflected on came partly from an observation I 
made late one evening while standing sentry at the summit.  The American 
mediators were hosts to Israelis and Palestinians and presumably counted on 
to help reconcile the parties.  But from what I could discern, it was the US 
negotiating team itself that often seemed to be at war—amongst itself. While it 
was far beyond my remit (and inappropriate) to try to understand the context 
then, I and many others could intuit that not all was right among the American 
diplomatic home team.  My later return to examine that thread would prove 
consequential.   
 
In fact, prior to The Truth About Camp David, there had been almost no insider 
American accounts of how badly mismanaged US diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli 
9 
 
conflict had been, especially as a result of excessive pro-Israel bias.  Instead, 
the mantra of Arab blame for the absence of peace had been all pervasive, 
personified by America’s longest serving US Middle East Envoy, Dennis Ross, 
whose memoire was published just a few months before my book.2  Ross’s 
nearly 900-page account was reliant on his notes, his memory, and offered little 
by way of internal critique on the effort he presided over.   
 
Three published works existed in the English language at the time of my 
publication that were reliant on authoritative accounts by actual summit 
participants who were willing to challenge Ross’s line. The first was produced 
by Akram Hanieh, a summit advisor to then-President Yasser Arafat, in the 
Winter 2001 edition of the Journal of Palestinian Studies.  Hanieh memorably 
opened this essay by saying “The Americans never listened to advice” and 
particularly took aim at the pro-Israel bias of Ross.3  The second, “Camp David:  
The Tragedy of Errors,” shocked New York Review of Books readers in August 
2001 as one of its authors, Robert Malley, a key aide to President Clinton, 
attacked the “Palestinians rejected a generous offer myth” by writing (along with 
his Palestinian co-author) how “strictly speaking, there never was an Israeli 
offer.”4  “Shattered Dreams,” a 2003 book by veteran French journalist Charles 
Enderlin, blended narratives primarily from Israeli, Arab, and European sources 
to lay out how the Oslo process ended in failure.5  In a review of Enderlin’s book 
aside mine, scholar Charles Smith observed how:  
 
“Swisher’s book differs markedly…He has interviewed many more 
participants in the discussions and preparations for talks; he 
provides a “behind-the-scenes” narrative that greatly adds to, 
rather than merely supplements, Enderlin’s present-tense point of 
view…[Swisher’s] is a much more historical version of what 
occurred, along with the background to the talks as well as the 
atmosphere within each negotiating team, relying on oral history, a 
                                                        
2 Dennis Ross. The Missing Peace. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 
2004). 
3 Akram Hanieh.  “The Camp David Papers” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 
30, no. 2 (Winter, 2001). 
4 Hussein Agha and Robert Malley.  “Camp David:  The Tragedy of Errors.”  
New York Review of Books, August 9, 2001.  
5 Charles Enderlin.  Shattered Dreams:  The Failure of the Peace Process in the 
Middle East 1995-2002, trans.  Susan Fairfield (New York:  The Other Press, 
2003).    
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warts-and-all approach that gives insight into personal tensions 
and disputes within the State Department and National Security 
Council groups and between them.”6   
 
Shlomo Ben Ami, who was Israel’s foreign minister at Camp David in 2000, 
described The Truth About Camp David inside his own memoire as “a recent 
insider account” that “offers plenty of evidence about the erratic way the 
American mediator handled the summit.”7   
 
Discovering that politically controversial information was no easy task.  
Declassification of State Department and White House records from this period 
was a very distant hope, and although I tried anyway through Freedom of 
Information Act requests, it was clear to me the only way to capture this period 
was to track down as many attendees as I could and convince them to speak.   
 
My research thus became qualitative by necessity through the directed use of 
interviews and oral history to record and understand this mediation effort.  As I 
learned more, my emphasis shifted to exploring US shortcomings, an evergreen 
topic at the time (and a focus that was anyhow unlikely to exist in classified 
after-action cables from the time period).  I specifically sought out note takers, 
translators, and career diplomats with the least political axe to grind.  As I wrote 
in my book, several of the American interviewees were genuinely eager to offer 
self-critical insights, even if it might anger the former US President they served.8  
Most interview participants were sent typed transcripts of our complete interview 
and given 30 days to amend or correct their remarks; only two subjects 
exercised this option.  Very few requested I withhold their names.  At least two 
who did were serving undercover CIA officers; one of them, Stanley Moscowitz, 
has since deceased, and had been the CIA Station Chief in Tel Aviv.   
                                                        
6 Smith, Charles D. "The Truth about Camp David: the Untold Story About the 
Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process." Middle East Policy 12, no. 1 
(2005): 156-161. 
7 Shlomo Ben-Ami. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy. 
(London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), 264.   
8 Given Bill Clinton’s wife Hillary was expected by many to seek the presidency 
herself, getting others to open up on negative aspects of the Clinton 
administration and its handling of a high-profile failure presented obvious risks.  
Given the small pool of Middle East policy wonks working this issue (whether for 
Democratic or Republican administrations) this tended to inhibit self-criticism.    
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I additionally pursued my field research abroad during trips to Cairo, Gaza City, 
Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Amman, and Damascus, interviewing non-
American subjects away from Washington and mostly within their own comfort 
zones. The obvious benefit of this field research was that I was also able to 
bring forward new Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian voices on the topic, many of 
whom had been narrated over by more senior and outspoken political figures, 
particularly from the West.         
 
Although The Truth About Camp David is based on more than “40 such 
interviews, with 500 pages of transcripts from digitally recorded depositions and 
notes,”9 the lasting impact of this research rests especially in the self-critical 
American interviews I obtained with relative proximity to the historical event 
(interviews done within two to four years from the event rather than decades 
later).  I explored the depths of American bias among key US negotiators, 
demonstrating the practical effect it had on both Palestinians and Israelis, and 
recorded the losing Palestinians cause to try and mitigate that bias.  I was also 
the first to demonstrate that US mediators abandoned America’s own 
recommended guidelines for conducting Arab-Israeli summitry, based on a 
thorough study prepared by veteran US diplomats for the quasi-government US 
Institute of Peace.10    
 
My concluding chapter shows how the Israelis and American “Arab blame” 
influence campaign helped calcify global and domestic public opinion against 
Palestinians, even impacting the incoming presidential administration of George 
W Bush.  My book concludes with Deputy Mideast Envoy Aaron David Miller 
recalling how he, along with Dennis Ross, misled the incoming Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell, during an initial meeting to understand what had really 
happened at Camp David: “Like any brief,” said Miller, “You don’t want to give 
                                                        
9 Clayton E. Swisher. The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the 
Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process. (New York: Nation Books, 2004), 
xxi.   
10 Ibid., 248-249.   
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centrality to how you fucked up.  Dennis could have never brought himself to do 
it, and neither could I.”11 
 
The positive reception to The Truth About Camp David helped open 
professional doors for me.  From 2005-2007, I was the director of programs at 
the DC-based Middle East Institute, a think-tank where I was a frequent 
commentator in the international media on US policy toward the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  I became a term member with the Council on Foreign Relation, and in 
2007, I joined the ranks of Al Jazeera English in Doha, Qatar.  Although in 2010 
I had become a field producer and reporter with Al Jazeera, it was in my earlier 
capacity recording Arab-Israeli diplomatic history that trusted Palestinian 
sources approached me with an amazing offer. I would be given exclusive 
access to more than 1,600 electronic files concerning the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations spanning the 1999-2010 period, many of which were closely 
guarded high-level diplomatic meeting minutes between US, Israeli, and 
Palestinian Authority officials.  These sources expressed hope that I would find 
a way to best ensure the material received a fair hearing and as wide an 
audience as possible.   
 
As the name implies, my research for The Palestine Papers was very much 
reliant on the official records from the vantage point of the Palestinian Authority, 
most of which were near-verbatim transcripts of confidential diplomatic 
encounters.  The notetakers of these documents tended to be Western-
educated lawyers who acted as quasi-stenographers during meetings attended 
by senior PA officials, whom these attorneys were employed to advise.  Almost 
all the files were in the English language, which Israelis and Palestinians 
negotiators mostly use when dealing with each other.     
 
 Although my initial focus was on presentation of these records for television 
(requiring an inevitable watering down owing to the medium), my vetting of the 
information and records had to be just as rigorous as any of my previous 
research, if not more so, given the electronic provenance of the documents and 
                                                        
11 Clayton E. Swisher. The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About 
the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process. (New York: Nation Books, 
2004), 405.  
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potential for manipulation.  While research for The Palestine Papers required 
me to discern information primarily through the testimony of documents, and in 
particular meeting transcripts, I had to inevitably return to oral history.  I 
conducted several taped interviews to verify the documents were authentic and 
to ascertain the context of specific discussions and statements.  In some 
instances, I interviewed US, Israeli, and Palestinian officials while they were 
unaware that I had transcripts of their discussion in my possession.  I did so to 
preserve the secrecy of the project but to also get a sense of how their own 
recall compared to the verbatim transcripts.  Unsurprisingly, the two accounts 
did not always reconcile, which required me to interview other witnesses to see 
if the document was correct or if the subject was giving jaundiced testimony, for 
example, to conceal something.12     
 
From the contents of the dialogue I extracted several revealing vignettes from 
The Palestine Papers concerning how Palestinians dealt with American pro-
Israel bias, sometimes in unexpected ways.  For example, I demonstrated how 
the lead Palestinian negotiator Dr Saeb Erekat had consigned the “refugee” file 
in final status negotiations to American mediators for decision, with full 
knowledge they were wholesale adopting the Israeli position to prevent a single 
refugee from returning.  Succumbing to Israeli and American pressure, Erekat 
and others sought to have the US force this decision so they could save political 
face, according to his co-workers.  I further analyzed how US mediation bias 
impacted discussions on Jerusalem and Borders, and how then-Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice threatened Palestinians that they would “not have a 
state” unless they allowed Israel to retain the illegal Ma’ale Adumim settlement.    
 
Under President Obama, I show how the State Department threatened to cut 
funding of the Palestinian Authority unless it saw “the same faces” (Abu Mazen 
                                                        
12 Clayton E. Swisher. The Palestine Papers: The End of the 
Road?  (London:  Hesperus Press, 2011), 45-47.  For example, Saeb Erekat 
told me in an interview that Palestinians in the diaspora would be allowed to 
vote in a referendum on any peace deal that might impact their right to return.  
The transcripts of his meeting with an EU Foreign Minister, however, recorded 
him boasting that such a vote was “never going to happen.”  Others present in 
the meeting confirmed for me the contemporaneous transcript is the correct 
version rather than the one Erekat provided me after the fact in our interview.   
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and Salaam Fayyad) in office after elections were held.13  US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton goes so far as to tell her Palestinian interlocuters how “Abu 
Mazen not running in the election is not an option—there is no alternative to 
him.”14  In addition to undermining democracy, I show how the official American 
preference for Abbas never materialized into any negotiating advantage vis-à-
vis Israel, which both Bush and Obama administrations overwhelmingly favored.  
If anything, the strings that came attached with being Washington’s preferred 
Arab peacemaker meant succumbing to its threats, as I demonstrated in my 
chapter addressing the PA’s decision to drop the Goldstone Investigation into 
whether war crimes were committed by Israel during the 2008/9 Operation Cast 
Lead assault on Gaza.15   
 
There were no publications similar to The Palestine Papers close to the time of 
its release, further underscoring the “black swan” nature of the leak itself.  The 
closest study examining US mediation bias came in a 2008 update of the US 
Institute of Peace study called “Negotiating Arab-Isreali Peace” by Messrs. 
Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky.16  This book focused on improving 
American diplomatic procedure and confirmed some of the harm caused by 
Arab perceptions of pro-Israel bias based on reflective interviews. But these 
authors lacked the transcripts of actual negotiations that I possessed.  And 
given how much of the volume of The Palestine Papers documents were from 
2008-2010 (during the so-called Annapolis Process), my publication naturally 
went beyond theirs, offering transparency in what was then an ongoing process 
renowned for its opaqueness.  In doing so The Palestine Papers equipped 
affected constituencies and critics of this entire process with hard evidence they 
could draw upon to reevaluate US mediation bias in a more informed way.   
 
 
 
                                                        
13 Clayton E. Swisher. The Palestine Papers: The End of the 
Road?  (London:  Hesperus Press, 2011), 60.  
14 Ibid.    
15 Ibid., 63.   
16 Kurtzer, Daniel C., and Scott B. Lasensky. Negotiating Arab–Israeli Peace: 
American Leadership in the Middle East. Washington DC, 2008. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Although heavy pro-Israel bias among US mediators helped explain why 
diplomacy failed in The Truth About Camp David and The Palestine Papers, 
scholars of the Arab-Israeli conflict could be forgiven for believing that biased 
mediation can sometimes work.   
 
In Part One of this essay, I will examine the intellectual architecture behind 
biased mediation, including arguments by some who hold forth that mediator 
bias can even be considered ideal.  For that scenario to work, I will show, there 
are rules to follow and conditions necessary to keep that bias from going too 
far.  My conceptual framework for this essay reexamines my own scholarship by 
applying the filters of negotiation and biased mediation theory.  I begin by first 
reviewing the existing scholarship concerning third-party intervention 
(mediation) and a subset of ideas therein on the desired attributes (whether 
biased or unbiased) of a mediator, which I will later critique. Part One provides 
overview on the behavior, level of involvement, and intensity of efforts such a 
mediator might employ in its strategy (eg. whether merely “procedural” or 
“directive”).  It also presents contrasting academic perspectives on biased 
mediation and summarizes the normative lessons they contain.  Finally, I also 
include a coercive diplomacy theory known as “leadership selection 
intervention” which has aggravated the effect of American mediation bias in the 
contemporary Arab-Israeli negotiations, a dynamic present in both my submitted 
publications. 
 
Part Two of this essay delves into the short-lived heyday where US mediators 
tempered their pro-Israel bias with evenhanded behavior.  Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
the late National Security Advisor to President Carter who helped negotiate the 
historic Camp David Accords in 1978 between Egypt and Israel, lamented the 
departure from this approach, where US mediation bias went from “relative 
impartiality to increasing partiality in favor of Israel, to essentially the adoption of 
the Israeli perspective on the Israeli-Arab conflict” by 2006.17  To examine what 
                                                        
17 Gati, Charles, ed. Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski. 
JHU Press, 2013. p. 189.  
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the first example of “relative impartiality” looked like, Part Two juxtaposes my 
conceptual framework against US diplomat Henry Kissinger’s biased but 
relatively evenhanded mediation following the October 1973 war, a 
considerable effort cited by some scholars who advocate biased mediation.   
 
This enables me to next compare the intensifying degree of American mediation 
bias nearly two decades later among the central mediators of the so-called Oslo 
“peace process” during the 1990s and 2000s.  My objective is to explain why 
earlier biased mediation theories fall short of capturing the collective efforts of 
Dennis Ross and others, as I take aim at the limitations to such theoretical 
modeling when it comes to eliciting practical historical understanding.   
 
I conclude in Part Three that the escalating degree of American mediation bias 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict differs from and exceeds what was envisioned in the 
scholarly literature on biased mediation—as pioneered by Saadia Touval in the 
1970s and whose research is based largely on that now distant era.  Moreover, 
that the US, to the detriment of global peace and stability, has in far more 
recent instances embodied characteristics found on the fringes of scholarly 
concepts of bias like “more royalist than the king” or “agent provocateur.” Even 
some former US diplomats have self-critically derided their own role as 
becoming that of “Israel’s lawyer.”   
 
Part Three offers my conclusion about how pro-Israel partisans acting as 
mediators defied these scholarly mediation bias models by critiquing their 
behavior as chronicled in The Truth About Camp David and The Palestine 
Papers. I discuss the continued lack of professional consequences facing 
biased American mediator who repeatedly fail in their mission.  I instead record 
how recent US Presidents have even come to regard extreme pro-Israel zeal 
among their negotiators as a domestic political bonus.  This phenomenon 
progressively brings us to the Trump Administration, whose envoys toward the 
Arab-Israeli conflict can more aptly be described as “extremist mediators.”     
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PART ONE:  SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON MEDIATION MODELS 
  
1.1 Research Background  
Historian Hilde Henriksen Waage has lamented the “striking neglect of history 
within the literature”18  on conflict management while assessing Norway’s 
mediation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In her 2007 study she noted how theories 
on third party intervention, mediation, facilitation, and the role of intermediaries 
had only recently developed owing to “great interest” by scholars and 
practitioners.19  Jacob Bercovitch also found shortcomings in scholars of 
international mediation for making “minimal use of historical experience,”20 and 
would also seek to correct that deficit with his 1986 “Case Study of Mediation as 
a Method of International Conflict Resolution: The Camp David Experience.”21  
Ignoring history is but one of the handicaps of the study of international 
mediation theory, according to Waage and Bercovitch. An oracular projection 
made by the latter more than 30 years prior foresaw the “growth in the number 
and intensity”22 of global conflicts, as Bercovitch warned scholars in the field of 
third party mediation that, despite “being as old as conflict itself,” conflict 
management remained the “least understood.”23 
 
1.2  Primer on International Mediation 
Bercovitch and Robert Powell view the cycle of war and conflict resolution as 
synonymous with a bargaining process.24 Defined by Zartman as “the process 
of combining divergent viewpoints to produce a common agreement,” 
negotiation is a means of managing or (ideally) bringing war and conflict to a 
                                                        
18 Hilde Henriksen Waage.  “The ‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’:  Norway and the 
United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East” British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, vol. 34, no. 2 (Aug, 2007), 160, footnote 11.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Jacob Bercovitch. “A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of International 
Conflict Resolution: The Camp David Experience.”  Review of International 
Studies, vol. 12, no. 1 (Jan 1986), 43. 
21 Referring to the US-brokered 1979 agreement between Israel and Egypt.   
22 Jacob Bercovitch.  “Third Parties in Conflict Management:  The Structure and 
Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations.”  International 
Journal, vol. 40, no. 4 (Autumn, 1985), 738.  
23 Ibid., 737.   
24 Jacob Bercovitch. “A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of International 
Conflict Resolution: The Camp David Experience.”  Review of International 
Studies, vol. 12, no. 1 (Jan 1986), 45; and Robert Powell. “Bargaining Theory 
and International Conflict.” Annual Review of Political Science. (2002), 1.   
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bargained conclusion.25  According to Bercovitch, the relationship between 
mediator and disputants should be “perceived by all as temporary only.”26  
Bercovitch adds that a mediator cannot be described as “neutral,” as it often is, 
because the very presence of one “alters the structure of a dispute.”27  In other 
words, the mediator may be impartial, but it is not accurate to say it is entirely 
disinterested, which “neutral” suggests.28 
 
Bercovitch classifies mediator methods according to the strategy it employs. 
The lowest form of intervention, which Bercovitch classifies as “communication” 
or “facilitation”, is a passive one in which the mediator “channels information”, 
“facilitates cooperation” but has “little control over the more formal process.” 
Following that is “procedural” mediation where the mediator exerts “more formal 
control over the mediation process,” controlling “where mediation takes place, 
how often the parties meet, how the agenda is structured and information about 
progress is distributed.” Finally, the most “powerful form of intervention” with the 
“highest level of mediator involvement” is mediation based on “directive 
strategies”, which shapes the “content and substance of the bargaining process 
by providing incentives for the parties or issuing ultimatums.  Directive 
strategies deal with, and aim to change, the motivation and behavior of the 
parties in dispute.”  Tactics of directive strategies include controlling the flow of 
information between parties, offering substantial guidance in resolving issues, 
encouraging concessions, flexibility and compliance, and proposing rewards 
and punishments on either party.29 
 
                                                        
25 William I Zartman. Negotiation and Conflict Management:  Essays on Theory 
and Practice. (New York, Routledge, 2008), 14. 
26 Jacob Bercovitch.  “Third Parties in Conflict Management:  The Structure and 
Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations.”  International 
Journal, vol. 40, no. 4 (Autumn, 1985), 739.  
27 Ibid., 739, footnote 5. 
28 Ibid. See also Oran R. Young. The Intermediaries:  Third Parties in 
International Crisis. (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1967), 81. 
“Neutrality, on the other hand, refers to a situation which the effects of the 
actions of a third party can be said to have no influence toward terminating a 
crisis more in favor of one side than the other.” 
29 Jacob Bercovitch and Lee Su-Mi. “Mediating International 
Conflicts:  Examining the Effectiveness of Directive Strategies.”  International 
Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2003), 3-4. 
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In a similar vein, Ronald J. Fisher articulated a comparable taxonomy of 
international mediation methods.30 “Conciliation” mediation provides for an 
informal communications link, like Bercovitch’s “communication”. “Consultation” 
provides creative problem solving through communications and analysis, a 
focus on the formalities of negotiations shared with Bercovitch’s “procedural” 
mediation. Finally, “pure mediation” facilitates a negotiated settlement on 
substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, effective control of 
information, and the suggestion of alternatives, which mirrors Bercovitch’s 
“directive strategies” in his mediation paradigm. Fisher notably goes beyond 
Bercovitch’s continuum, suggesting three further mediation strategies noted for 
their escalating “involuntary” attributes. As such, “power mediation” 
“encompasses pure mediation but also moves beyond to include the use of 
leverage or coercion on the part of the mediator in the form of promised rewards 
or threatened punishments, and may also involve the third party as monitor and 
guarantor of the agreement”31. “Arbitration” can render a “binding judgement” 
and then “[impose] a settlement”. Finally, a “peacekeeping” mediation role sees 
a mediator sending military forces to enforce a cease-fire or provide 
humanitarian aid. 
 
Most if not all of the characteristics of American mediation of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict oscillate between what Bercovitch terms “procedural” and “directive” 
strategies and what Fisher calls “pure mediation” or “power mediation.” Both 
schemes dance the fine line between voluntary and involuntary.  And in the 
contemporary Arab-Israeli conflict, which sees the American mediator vowing to 
never “impose a solution”32 much less commit its military forces to prevent 
hostilities, the latter categories of binding arbitration or peacekeeping described 
by Fisher are beyond the remit of this essay.33 
                                                        
30 R. J. Fisher. “Methods of third-party intervention”. In Advancing Conflict 
Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II, edited by B. Austin, M. Fischer & H. 
J. Geissmann, 157-182. Opladen, Germany: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 165-
166. 
31 Ibid, 166. Emphasis added. 
32 William B Quandt. “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Now”, The Cairo Review of 
Global Affairs, Published in Spring 2011, Last Accessed on October 18, 2017, 
https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-now-2/. 
33 R. J. Fisher. “Methods of third-party intervention”. In Advancing Conflict 
Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II, edited by B. Austin, M. Fischer & H. 
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Of particular relevance, evidence from the literature suggests the sticks and 
carrots of “directive” and “power mediation” strategies can and do work.  
Drawing on data sets of 295 conflicts from 1945 to 1995, Bercovitch concludes 
that the most successful mediator strategies have been directive in nature; that 
is, when the mediator is most aggressively engaged—using pressure, rewards, 
and punishment—and with the highest level of engagement.34  Thus the 
mediator employing “directive” (Bercovitch) or “power mediator” (Fisher) 
methods—which are inherently involuntary—are ideal for conflict resolution, 
even though resorting to pressure tactics would be at odds with conventional 
US policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.35  This means that, despite the 
dictates of policy and the parties of the conflict, a mediator seeking success 
should be prepared to forge ahead and aggressively pressure one or both of 
the parties to do something it does not want to do, using some manner of 
incentives and punishments. 
 
1.3 Unbiased/Impartial and Biased/Partial Mediators 
Broadly speaking, there are two scholarly paradigms that characterize mediator 
alignment: whether unbiased/impartial or biased/partial.  Andrew Kydd 
categorizes a mediator as “biased in favor of one state if it prefers territorial 
                                                        
J. Geissmann, 157-182. Opladen, Germany: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 166. 
Fisher describes conflicts where “segregation” exists, that is, the “use of threats, 
high levels of distrust, categorization of ‘good vs. evil’” as worthy of not just 
power mediation but also binding arbitration.  Similarly, according to Fisher, 
where parties attempt to “annihilate” or pursue “genocide” or view the other as 
“subhuman” with their survival at stake, Fisher prescribes “peacekeeping.”  
While both of these attributes exist at varying points in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it 
speaks volumes that arbitration or peacekeeping—particularly in the context of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—has yet to be seriously entertained by the 
American mediator.    
34 Jacob Bercovitch and Lee Su-Mi. “Mediating International 
Conflicts:  Examining the Effectiveness of Directive Strategies.”  International 
Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2003), 15. 
35 A recent book by analyst Nathan Thrall titled The Only Language They 
Understand:  Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine convincingly argues 
that throughout its short history, Arabs and Israelis have only compromised on 
issues where forceful intervention and diplomacy was carried out, including with 
sticks rather than carrots.  This would suggest support for Bercovitch’s theory 
that aggressive mediation stands a better chance than lesser, “procedural” 
approach with negotiations. See Nathan Thrall. The Only Language They 
Understand: Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine. (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2017). 
21 
 
distributions that favor that state”36 and “unbiased if it is indifferent” to that 
outcome.37  There is no definitive verdict from the scholarship over which form 
of mediator alignment proves more successful, only persuasive arguments for 
and against both approaches and recognition that more scholarship on the 
subject should be undertaken.   
 
Oran Young makes the case for the unbiased mediator in his 1967 book The 
Intermediaries, writing “it is reasonable to expect substantial impartiality from a 
third party.”38  Young defines impartiality as “a situation in which the third party 
favors neither side to a conflict and remains indifferent to the gains and losses 
of each side;” the “intangible” qualities of an impartial mediator as “having 
nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist and in the sense of being able to 
control any feelings of favoritism.”39  Ideas proposed by an unbiased party 
“embody greater elements of fairness and are thus more compelling.”40  Fisher 
writes that “impartial mediators who operate in a fair and even-handed fashion 
are more acceptable to the parties and more effective.”41  
 
The intuitive conclusion to avoid biased mediators was evidently confirmed by a 
series of human experiments in the 1980s designed to test the effects of 
mediator bias. Gary Welton and Dean Pruitt observed how “suggestions from 
biased mediators are viewed with suspicion.”42  A separate 1991 experiment on 
biased mediation corroborates that claim.  Testing mediation bias on volunteer 
groups, psychologists Jerry Wittmer, Peter Carnevale and Michael Walker 
                                                        
36 Robert Powell. “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict.”  Annual 
Review of Political Science. (2002), 16.    
37 Andrew Kydd.  “Where Can Mediators Build Trust?”  The American Political 
Science Review, vol. 100, no. 3 (Aug, 2006), 451.   
38 Oran R. Young. The Intermediaries:  Third Parties in International Crisis. 
(Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1967), 82, footnote 2 citing Wilder 
Foote. 
39 Ibid., 81.  
40 Jerry Wittmer et al. “General Alignment and Overt Support in Biased 
Mediation” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 35, no. 4 (Dec, 1991), 595. 
41 R. J. Fisher. “Methods of third-party intervention”. In Advancing Conflict 
Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II, edited by B. Austin, M. Fischer & H. 
J. Geissmann, 157-182. Opladen, Germany: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 173.   
42 Dean G Pruitt and Gary L Welton. “The Mediation Process:  The Effects of 
Mediator Bias and Disputant Power.” Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, vol. 13, no. 1 (March, 1987), 130. 
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noticed how those condemned to the mediator’s disfavored side would 
“question the candor and truthfulness” of biased mediators, even when 
“favorable recommendations” were tabled. The disfavored side were cautious 
against a “perceived appearance of a Trojan horse in the form of a favorable 
recommendation.”43   
 
Disfavored parties demonstrated paranoia that a biased mediator’s even-
handed ideas would inevitably come with undisclosed “strings attached,” as 
some in the experiment went so far as to praise the biased mediator with over-
credit when “even-handed” proposals were tabled.44 Wittmer et al. hypothesize 
“it is plausible that disputants view a mediator who is biased against them, but 
who acts in an even-handed manger, as especially laudable.”45  More broadly, 
Wittmer et al. noted how “favored parties make fewer concessions than 
disfavored parties because the former are strengthened by having the mediator 
aligned with them.”46  Conversely, in order to correct that imbalance and curry 
the favor of the mediator, the disfavored party needs to make more 
concessions.   
 
In situations where the there is a weak disfavored party up against a strong 
opponent with a biased mediator in its corner, the weak party would ipso facto 
be situated with a major disadvantage. Young cautions that, should a mediator 
appear in the biased/partial category to either side, “it loses its status as a true 
third party and becomes more assimilated to one or the other of the 
antagonists.”47 
  
Saadia Touval’s The Peace Brokers advocates for a re-examination of Young’s 
thesis that unbiased mediators are ideal, arguing that mediator bias is not a 
handicap but in some instances an asset.  Touval posits that specific examples 
drawn from the Arab-Israeli conflict demonstrate that “impartiality is neither an 
                                                        
43 Jerry Wittmer et al. “General Alignment and Overt Support in Biased 
Mediation” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 35, no. 4 (Dec, 1991), 607.  
44 Ibid.   
45 Ibid., 597. 
46 Ibid., 596.   
47 Oran R. Young. The Intermediaries:  Third Parties in International Crisis. 
(Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1967), 81. 
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indispensable condition for the acceptability of mediators, nor for their 
success.”48 
 
To summarize Touval:  when a third-party intervenes in a 2-way conflict, the 
very presence of the mediator makes it a 3-way relationship.49  If the mediator is 
impartial they cannot become part of a coalition, whereas if the mediator is 
biased a coalition becomes possible.  Indeed, the very threat of having the 
mediator join a coalition or stay in a pre-existing one (threatening to leave the 
other party ‘high and dry’) arms the mediator with an important bargaining 
leverage. But because all participate in a mediation voluntarily and can 
withdraw at any time, the mediator’s biased behavior is kept in check by the 
need to safeguard their continued acceptability to both sides. In this dynamic, 
knowing the mediator might join a coalition or defect from one produces a 
continual desire by both parties to influence the mediator’s behavior and win 
them over.  The favored party will try and preserve its favored position.  The 
disfavored party will respond with countermeasures to drive a wedge between 
the two by persuading it with forthcoming ideas and actions.   
 
For Touval, the US is the archetypal biased mediator insofar as the ideal 
mediator should hail from a single, powerful state. The “more powerful the 
state,” he writes, “the more able it is to influence the parties to alter their 
positions.”50 The strong state as biased mediator supplies political coverage for 
a deal and can make any proposal more appealing with generous amounts of 
financial aid or other benefits to “compensate parties for the disadvantages that 
they incur because of the concessions they make.”51  Once agreement is 
reached they can also “monitor implementation” and “guarantee their 
observance.”52 The spectrum of these activities suggests Touval would have 
the biased mediator operate under what Bercovitch would later classify as 
“directive strategy” (Fisher: “power mediation”), where the biased mediator 
                                                        
48 Saadia Touval. The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
1948-1979. (Princeton, New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1982), 12.   
49 Ibid., 15-16. 
50 Ibid., 17. 
51 Ibid., 7.  
52 Ibid.  
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would be highly engaged in shaping the contours of an agreement through 
carrots (such as providing money) and sticks (later withholding it).    
 
William Zartman further developed Touval’s ideas on biased mediation and 
joined him in a series of collaborations, concluding: “the mediator has its own 
motivating interests and need not be impartial but it is expected to deliver the 
side toward which it is biased”.53  The prospect of “delivery,” argues Zartman, 
will even “stimulat[e]… cooperation” by the least favored party.54  Wittmer et al. 
found through experimentation that “what a mediator does (or recommends) is 
more important to disputants than with whom the mediator is aligned,” a 
conclusion that seemingly comports with the scholarship of Touval and 
Zartman.55  
 
Kydd argues that a biased mediator reduces conflict by eliminating “uncertainty 
about the resolve of the other party.”56  If you are the mediator’s disfavored 
party, Kydd suggests, you will take biased advice because it comes from a 
position of deep insider access which gives the mediator a greater 
understanding of its preferred party.   Similarly, when the biased mediator 
“counsels restraint” to its favored ally it would heed that advice as it comes from 
a place of affinity and is unlikely to lead its friend astray.  
 
Biased mediation can only work, according to Kydd, when both sides firmly 
believe that the information the mediator supplies is truthful and accurate. In 
fulfilling the information-sharing role Kydd also sees unbiased mediators as 
handicapped by their pacifism: “If she cannot be trusted to send messages that 
increase the likelihood of war,” Kydd notes, then “she cannot be trusted when 
she sends messages that decrease it, either.”57  To succeed, Kydd notes the 
                                                        
53 William I Zartman. Negotiation and Conflict Management:  Essays on Theory 
and Practice. (New York, Routledge, 2008), 7. Underlined and italicized for my 
own emphasis. See also Chapter 10 “International Mediation”. 
54 Ibid., 162. 
55 Jerry Wittmer et al. “General Alignment and Overt Support in Biased 
Mediation” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 35, no. 4 (Dec, 1991), 597. 
56 Andrew Kydd. “Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility and Mediation.”, 
January 2, 2012. http://wcfia.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/468_janmed.pdf, 2.  
57 Ibid., 32.   
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biased mediator must filter “cheap talk” from the parties,58 as each will be prone 
to bluffing and insist it has “high resolve” to fight on a matter.  
 
1.4 “More Royal Than the King” and Bias Countermeasures:   
The literature addresses extreme mediator bias and mechanisms for disputants 
to guard against it.  For example, Kydd describes a “more royalist than the King” 
scenario where the mediator becomes so excessively biased that it actually 
prefers to invoke bigger demands than its favored party is willing to make.59 The 
biased mediator would then have the intent to foment conflict—a position so 
biased, says Kydd, that not only would the mediator not care if it leads to war, it 
would in fact prefer it.  Powell describes a similar phenomenon where the 
mediator is so biased toward a particular territorial outcome that it becomes an 
agent provocateur. Powell notes that for decades the United States sought to 
keep the Soviet Union away from a mediating role so the former would not “stir 
up trouble” as an agent provocateur without addressing whether the US and its 
excessive mediation bias could be construed as obstructionist.60      
 
Kydd states that the way to diminish mediator bias lies in the “importance of a 
continuing relationship” between all parties that may extend “into the future.”61  
In a peace process, Kydd explains that repetitive interactions between mediator 
and disputants acts to incentivize mediator honesty, even where there is bias, 
as a reputational “credit rating” forms.  One countermeasure to regulate 
credibility of biased mediators, Kydd notes, arises when:   
 
“Mediators that are biased, but not too biased, can still be honest brokers 
if they could lose their position by being caught vouching for players who 
subsequently betray the other side.”62   
 
1.5  Beware the Biased Mediator 
                                                        
58 Ibid., 7. 
59 Andrew Kydd. “Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility and Mediation.”, 
January 2, 2012. http://wcfia.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/468_janmed.pdf, 21. 
60 Robert Powell. “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict.”  Annual 
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61 Andrew Kydd.  “Where Can Mediators Build Trust?”  The American Political 
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62 Ibid. (Author’s emphasis) 
26 
 
More recent scholarship by Fisher (2011) along with a 2012 study by Bernd 
Beber further challenge biased mediation theory. Beber attributes “favorable or 
indifferent views”63 toward biased mediation as lacking statistical evidence to 
support it, suggesting its utility is “theoretical” or reliant on analysis of the same 
historical conflicts which may ignore alternative explanations for why those 
negotiations succeeded.64 
 
Challenging Touval and Zartman’s assertions that favored disputants are more 
likely to agree to a concession by the biased mediator than the unbiased one, 
Beber asks: “What happens if the mediator believes that not his ally, but the 
other disputant needs to make a concession in order for a settlement to be 
feasible?”65  In such circumstances, he answers, the biased mediator would 
always ask the disfavored party for a concession—its aim, after all, is to “design 
an agreement that allocates as much as possible to his preferred disputant.”66  
It is for these reasons, Beber believes, the disfavored party would be unlikely to 
accept such an arrangement.   
 
Utilizing data sets of conflicts even more recent than Bercovitch, from 1990-
2005, Beber argues biased mediation has proven itself, in fact, relatively 
ineffective.67  Citing case material from African civil wars, Fisher also concludes 
that biased mediators “who are typically powerful, have been largely 
unsuccessful in brokering agreements between conflicting parties.”68  Fisher 
comments on the power dynamics between warring parties, noting that a 
mediator can generally prove useful when it advocates on behalf of weaker 
                                                        
63 Bernd Beber. “International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of 
Bias.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 29 (4), 399.   
64 Ibid. Insofar as US biased mediation on the Arab-Israeli conflict was 
concerned, the focus of Touval and Zartman’s scholarship on American 
mediation bias came from analysis of that performance pre-1980’s. 
65 Ibid., 404. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Beber broadened his more recent data set conflicts as those resulting in more 
than 1000 deaths, whereas Bercovitch’s data sets from 1945-1995 included 
conflicts generating fewer than 1000 deaths. See Bernd Beber. “International 
Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of Bias.” Conflict Management 
and Peace Science 29 (4), 407. 
68 R. J. Fisher. “Methods of third-party intervention”. In Advancing Conflict 
Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II, edited by B. Austin, M. Fischer & H. 
J. Geissmann, 157-182. Opladen, Germany: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 173. 
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parties rather than strong ones.  “Without some degree of power parity, 
however,  
 
…the intervention process can easily become a sham, in which the 
stronger party influences the interaction for its own benefit, while the 
fundamental issues remain unaddressed.”69  
 
This would be especially problematic where one of the parties has what Fisher 
describes as “devious objectives,” that is, where there is not a “real commitment 
to compromise” and where parties may use the mediation to “stall for time” and 
improve its bargaining position.70   
 
Beber also explains the motivating factors behind why a biased mediator would 
offer itself up in a conflict.  Mediation is expensive—financially and politically—
and can otherwise divert what are presumably scarce resources of the sending 
state.  According to Beber, an unbiased mediator “who does not care… about 
the size or allocation of what is at stake… will intervene… if [it] is sufficiently 
cheap to provide.”71  This may be owing to the prestige associated with 
facilitating a diplomatic outcome or based on altruistic reasons like lessening 
global conflict and war. Conversely, the agenda behind a biased mediator 
suggests it will dismiss the attendant costs and  
 
“be tempted to intervene even if mediation is costly to provide in order to 
shape the outcome of the dispute.  The more is at stake in a dispute, the 
more willing is a biased third party to step into the fray...”72   
 
Beber also forebodes how “third parties that are relatively ineffective at bringing 
about settlements should be relatively likely to select into mediation.”73  For the 
disadvantaged party, the lesson is clear:  beware the most eager volunteer 
seeking to become mediator.  
 
1.6 Leadership Selection Intervention  
                                                        
69 Ibid., 172.  
70 Ibid., 162. 
71 Bernd Beber. “International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of 
Bias.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 29 (4), 406.   
72 Ibid.   
73 Ibid., 404.   
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Negotiating an end of conflict “takes place in an impressively diverse array of 
settings ranging from the interpersonal to the international,” writes Bercovitch, 
adding “it is therefore surprising to note the absence of a single model that can 
be used to describe what it is exactly that mediators or third parties do.”74 
Indeed, neither broad conflict resolution models, nor biased mediation literature 
alone can explain the nature of American behavior in the context of the Arab-
Israeli peace negotiations as documented in my two submitted works.   
 
One recurring activity I noticed in research for this essay—Washington’s picking 
of “winners” within Middle East politics—is a valid political science theory 
studied by David Weinberg and termed “Leadership Selection Intervention” (or 
“LSI”).  Weinberg defines LSI as “one government’s efforts to bolster or change 
the character of another government’s ruling coalition using methods short of 
force.”75  A form of diplomacy targeting another state’s government, Weinberg 
categorizes LSI as being more aggressive than “coercive diplomacy” and less 
aggressive than “regime change by pressure.”    
 
In a mediation context, one where the parties participate voluntarily (as 
described by Bercovitch and Touval) one cannot discount the impact LSI would 
have by a party to the conflict on the receiving end of this subversion.  This is 
especially true given the power dynamic between the US and Israel and the US 
and the Arab states.  That the US would engage in LSI whilst concurrently 
serving as the Arab-Israeli conflict principal mediator necessitates some 
inclusion into this essay.  LSI is a seldom acknowledged form of duress that 
exceeds the usual sticks and carrots approach employed by most third parties. 
With increased frequency in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it seems that LSI manifests 
itself in sometimes covert US-led ploys to set the agenda and define who the 
                                                        
74 Jacob Bercovitch. “A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of International 
Conflict Resolution: The Camp David Experience.”  Review of International 
Studies, vol. 12, no. 1 (Jan 1986), 44. 
75 David Andrew Weinberg. “Playing Favorites: Washington’s Meddling for 
Peace in the Politics of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.” MIT Thesis 
Dissertation submitted September 4, 2012. 
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actual parties seated around the table are allowed to be (including influencing 
the voting process in that country to try and see favored candidates win). 
 
PART TWO:  FROM “BIASED BUT EVENHANDED” TO “ISRAEL’S LAWYER” 
 
2.1   Kissinger As Biased But Evenhanded  
This section reassesses the dynamics of Henry Kissinger’s mediation bias in 
the aftermath of the October 1973 war.  As US Secretary of State and National 
Security Advisor, Kissinger had embarked on a series of “shuttle diplomacy” 
trips to disentangle Arab and Israeli troops, draw Arab states away from the 
Soviet orb of influence, and create an overall de-escalation to allow permanent 
peace talks to take place.  From October 1973 until May 1974, William Quandt 
estimates that Kissinger devoted between “one half to two-thirds” of his total 
time—and by extension, the full weight of the US national security and foreign 
policy apparatus—toward brokering Israeli-Egyptian (Jan 1974) and Israeli-
Syrian (May/June 1974) military disengagements.76 Kissinger would seal a 
second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement in September 1975, a deal 
that would auger positively for President Carter’s later efforts at Camp David in 
1978.     
 
At this point in history, the Arab parties would only deal with the US rather than 
directly with Israel.77  Owing to its special relationship, the Israelis preferred 
American mediation to a multilateral setting involving the Soviet Union, which 
had been proposed at a conference in Geneva.  Israel distrusted the Soviets for 
selling weapons to its Arab adversaries while doubting they had sufficient 
political leverage over the Soviet’s future welfare to equalize any pro-Arab bias 
during negotiations (Welton & Pruitt, Kydd).  The Israelis also clearly preferred 
the US as a guarantor to any agreement with the Arabs, or as then-Minister of 
Defense Moshe Dayan said at the time “it was essential that the United States 
                                                        
76 William B Quandt. “Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement 
Negotiations,” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 29, no. 1 (Spring 1975), 38. 
77 Ibid., 33. Quandt notes “Virtually since the creation of the state of Israel in 
1948, Arab leaders have refused to negotiate directly with Israel since this could 
be interpreted as a recognition of Israel’s legitimacy.”  This stance was famously 
expressed in the “Three No’s” at the Khartoum Conference in August 1967: “No 
negotiations, no recognition, no peace.”  
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be involved in the negotiations so that she would share responsibility for its 
implementation.”78  
 
Suspicions over Kissinger’s personal pro-Israel bias presented a formidable 
challenge for his mission as mediator, which he consciously sought to mitigate.  
Touval observes “Egyptians perceived Kissinger to be doubly biased” as the US 
was considered Israel’s sponsor and Kissinger was presumed to be loyal firstly 
to Israel.79 In an interview with prominent Egyptian journalist Muhammed 
Haikal, Kissinger responded to those concerns using careful language: 
 
Haikal:  If your role is not the role of the ‘other party,’ the ‘role of the 
negotiator,’ what exactly is your role?  Is it the role of ‘mediator’? 
Kissinger:  Again, I do not think so…indeed I am sure not.  The role of 
mediator requires neutrality between the two parties…or at least that the 
two parties should feel that this neutrality exists or could exist. 
Haikal:  We do not feel this.  Your bias towards Israel needs no proof.  
The latest indication of it is the air and sea bridge which is bringing arms 
and ammunition from the United States to Israel.  So you are not and 
cannot be neutral; you cannot be a mediator… 
Kissinger:  Let us say, and agree to say, that I represent the role of the 
‘concern’ of the United States for a grave crisis which is taking place in 
an area that is sensitive as far as we are concerned, an area in which we 
have strategic, political and economic interests—and security interests—
and we want to protect these interests...80   
 
In a more stunning reference to the actual Israeli-American power dynamic that 
generations of later US mediators would try to downplay, Kissinger told Haikal:  
 
                                                        
78 Saadia Touval. The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
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79 Ibid., 275.   
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The USSR can give you arms… but the United States can give you a just 
solution which will give you back your territories, especially as you have 
been able to really change the situation in the Middle East.81 
 
Quandt critiques Kissinger for “his misreading of Arab intentions was his belief 
that war would be prevented by maintaining the military balance in Israel’s 
favor.”82  Indeed, as Kissinger appeared to be telling Haikal and his Arab 
audience, it was military strategy and force by the Arabs in the October 1973 
surprise attack that Kissinger ultimately respected.  Later generations of Arabs 
could be forgiven for understanding that not only Israel but America would 
ignore their negotiating concerns absent a credible threat of force. To that 
inevitability, Kissinger said, “It was not in our interest to seek [Israeli] 
subservience” as: 
 
once it was proved that we could make Israel do anything, Arab 
demands would escalate… Our strategy depended on being the only 
country capable of eliciting Israeli concessions, but also on our doing 
within a context where this was perceived to be a difficult task.  There is 
no doubt that the Israelis dedicated themselves to the second part of that 
proposition with more intensity than to the first.83   
 
Indeed, there appeared to be no respite for Kissinger among the Israeli side he 
favored. Touval opines “Kissinger’s Jewishness may even have aroused some 
fear that he might lean over backward in order to demonstrate that his policy 
was not influenced by his inherent pro-Israel sentiments.”84  Kissinger 
biographers described his frustration with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir 
playing the “Jewish” card with him, with Kissinger reportedly going so far as to 
say, “Golda, you’re killing me…Don’t you realize I’m supposed to be the 
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Secretary of State for the United States of America.  Forget the Jewish thing.”85   
When Arab foreign ministers sought assurances from Nixon during the war over 
Kissinger’s bias and suitability, Kissinger recalls: 
 
“He [Nixon] promised me as a negotiator.  He implied—to my horror—
that this ensured success.  He returned to a familiar theme from his first 
term, assuring his guests that despite my Jewish origin I was not subject 
to domestic, that is to say Jewish, pressures.”86  
 
Whatever intentions Nixon had to exploit Kissinger’s religious background, 
sympathetic biographers paint Kissinger as being obsessed with his credentials 
as an “evenhanded” mediator among Arabs and Israelis.87 Kissinger had been 
to Israel “a couple of times” before becoming Secretary of State but had “never 
stepped foot in an Arab country” and claimed no “Middle East expertise.”88   
Despite that, Kissinger acknowledged he was consciously aware of his pro-
Israeli bias throughout: 
 
Though not practicing my religion, I could never forget that thirteen 
members of my family had died in Nazi concentration camps.  I had no 
stomach for encouraging another holocaust by well-intentioned policies 
that might get out of control.  Most Israeli leaders were personal friends.  
And yet, like Nixon, I had to subordinate my emotional preferences to my 
perception of the national interest.  Indeed, given the historical 
suspicions toward my religion, I had a special obligation to do so.  It was 
not always easy; occasionally, it proved painful. But Israel’s security 
could be preserved in the long run only by anchoring it to a strategic 
interest of the United States, not to the sentiments of individuals.89   
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Kissinger reportedly felt so strongly about Israel he made a “private pact with 
himself to resign” should President Nixon have moved toward imposing a 
solution on Israel,90 further evidencing his partiality on the subject.      
With Arabs, Quandt recalls how Kissinger emphasized America’s credibility in 
the negotiations by assuring that “the United States would not promise what it 
could not deliver, but it would deliver everything it promised.”91 To ensure his 
own centrality as a mediator, Kissinger initiated intensely private negotiations 
shuttling between each side in an incremental, step-by-step fashion.92  
Performing the “information sharing” role as described by Kydd, Kissinger spent 
“a major part” of his time “educating each party about the constraints operating 
on the others.”93 Israelis and Syrians had almost no personal contact, and knew 
precious little about the other. Accurate insights obtained during Kissinger’s 
marathon sessions would therefore prove valuable as each sought to 
understand the position and true resolve of the other (Kydd). According to 
Quandt, Kissinger recognized “his credibility depended largely on his ability to 
portray accurately the positions” of the disputants.94  In style, he used his 
“prestige and reputation as a negotiator” as well as his “considerable powers of 
persuasion.”95   
 
Quandt also describes Kissinger’s fraught relationship with Israel during the 
talks. The Israeli state sought from the outset to limit America to a mere 
“messenger” between the two sides; anything further and it would walk.96  
Israelis envisioned Kissinger as a facilitator rather than catalyst for ideas, and 
insisted that he not table any proposal without first seeking Israel’s advance 
approval, appearing to preempt any “power mediation” (Fisher) or “directive” 
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strategies (Bercovitch), just in case Kissinger had those in mind, which he 
ultimately did. Recognizing Israel’s ability to use countermeasures against the 
US via the American pro-Israel lobby, Nixon and Kissinger both tried initially to 
purchase its complaisance.  As the 1973 war raged they pledged to generous 
financial ($2.2 billion) and military support for Israel to fend off pressure.97    
 
Unsurprisingly, this US aid for Israel helped fuel the conflict and drew the ire of 
the Arab world, particularly oil-producing Gulf countries, which wielded and 
were willing to use their considerable leverage over the US in a bid to keep its 
bias in check.  Moments after the US announced its billions for Israel, Saudi 
King Faisal “announced an embargo of oil to the United States as well as 
substantial production cuts.”98 Separately, six of the Gulf Arab members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) unilaterally raised the 
price of oil by 70 percent, a move which Kissinger writes had “revolutionary 
implications.”99  Vehicles cued in long lines at gas stations all across the United 
States, putting into sharp relief its dependence on Arab energy.  This was a rare 
moment when Arab states would successfully exercise negotiation leverage 
over the United States.100  It was also (citing Welton and Pruitt) an effective 
measure to offset if not neutralize America’s pro-Israel bias throughout the 
negotiations it led.   
 
Indeed, as progress in the disengagement talks became evident and as 
Kissinger established good relations with the Arab states, the embargo was 
relaxed.  Among Arabs, Quandt praises Kissinger for establishing “close 
personal relations” with both Assad and Sadat,” noting his “frankness, candor 
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and sense of humor had early gained him the respect of Arab negotiators.”101  
Kissinger, too, showed respect for his Arab interlocutors.   He was seen to view 
Egypt’s Sadat, “like himself, as a strategist” and saw in Syria’s Assad “a first-
class mind” and “fascinating character, one with whom a deal could be 
struck.”102  
 
On each track, Egyptian and Syrian, Kissinger methodically broke each issue 
down into smaller components, looking for zones of agreement, resolving those 
first with an eye toward building upward and onward.  On the Egyptian track, 
where Sadat felt unable to politically accept smaller Israeli ideas on limitations 
of forces in the Sinai, Kissinger offered to put them forward as American ideas 
to be enshrined in bilateral letters between Nixon and Sadat.103  These more 
limited concessions still benefitted Egypt: in making a partial withdrawal in the 
Sinai, Israel set a historic precedent by withdrawing for the first time from 
territory it occupied in the 1967 war, even accepting the establishment of a UN 
zone, complete with UN blue helmets to monitor the ceasefire.104  
 
Turning to Syria, Kissinger resorted to “power mediation” (Fisher) or “directive 
strategies” (Bercovitch), as Israel became intransigent, by penning a letter to 
the Israeli Prime Minister threatening to “reexamine the relationship between 
the two countries,” which caused Golda Meir to relent.105  Note that Kissinger 
was pressuring the stronger party which enjoyed American bias, rather than the 
Arabs who were already disadvantaged and did not have the US in its preferred 
corner.  Kissinger persisted with this forceful level of mediation engagement.  
As Israelis and Syrians came within hundreds of meters of agreement on Israeli 
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withdrawal from the Syrian town of Quneitra, he presented bridging US terms, 
which were ultimately accepted.106  
 
Following Nixon’s resignation amidst the Watergate scandal, President Gerald 
Ford requested Kissinger stay on as Secretary of State.  For Arabs and Israelis, 
there was clearly an American mediation policy continuum from one 
administration to another—who could build on accrued credibility and persist 
with ongoing interactions (Kydd)—rather than an abrupt assignment of a new 
US mediator, untested and starting from scratch.107  
 
Under Ford, Kissinger initially sought to pursue an Israeli-Jordanian agreement, 
which would address the fate of Palestinians.  According to Quandt, “the 
unstated belief was that it was worth trying to bring Jordan into the diplomacy as 
a way of undercutting the more radical PLO.”108  Yet before 1975, Kissinger had 
been less than sanguine that negotiations with Jordan would succeed.  King 
Hussein, seen as a moderate, had only symbolically participated in the 1973 
War, and lacked the “strong man” image Israel respected; it later emerged 
Hussein had secretly coordinated Jordan’s actions in the war in concert with 
Israel, Jordanian participation was a mere gesture to save face on the Arab 
street.109 Kissinger writes that “all planning and discussions with other 
governments regarding the West Bank of the Jordan River had assumed that 
King Hussein would be Israel’s negotiating partner.”110  That proved a faulty 
assumption. Moreover, though expelled from Jordan, the PLO had been gaining 
strength and, at an Arab League summit in October 1974, received a 
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unanimous declaration naming them as the “sole legitimate representative for 
the Palestinian people.”  This effectively split the Palestinian issue away from 
Jordan, relieving King Hussein of responsibility as the PLO’s Yasser Arafat took 
center stage. Quandt recalls Kissinger being “unprepared for this turn of 
events.”111 Looking askance, the Ford Administration sidelined the Palestinians 
by pursuing instead a second Israeli-Egyptian disengagement. 
 
Here Kissinger would again use “power mediation” (Fisher) or “directive 
strategies” (Bercovitch) by exerting American pressure on Israel to compel its 
further withdrawal,112 facilitated by the fact that the Israel had already done so 
in the first agreement.  In return the Israelis demanded staggering financial 
rewards in the form of another $2 billion dollar US aid commitment; a sentiment 
Quandt summarized as: “If the Americans wanted an agreement so badly, they 
could pay for it.” 113 
 
Yet again, during the mediation both Kissinger and Ford found Israel less 
forthcoming. 114 A review of recently declassified memorandums of conversation 
available at the Ford Presidential Library115 reveals the heated exchanges 
between Kissinger and his Israeli counterparts.  In Israel, the new Prime 
Minister Yitzak Rabin found Kissinger “a tough—and occasionally dangerous—
rival” rather than a mediator.116 In March 1975, when Rabin intimated collapsing 
the talks, an exasperated Kissinger appealed:   
 
Even if you say it’s my fault, the result will be a massive loss of American 
influence in the Middle East, and no chance of ever having another 
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exercise like this again.  The United States will be out as a major 
player.117 
 
Following this, Kissinger announced the suspension of his mission, while 
President Ford announced he would “reassess” the entire strategic US-Israeli 
relationship, the second time such a threat against Israel was engineered by 
Kissinger.  In both instances the US President stood squarely behind him. As 
Rabin would later reflect, reassessment was “an innocent-sounding term that 
heralded one of the worst periods in American-Israeli relations.”118   For nearly 
six months, the US refused to sign new arms deals with Israel.  
 
Though Rabin lambasted him for it, Kissinger blamed Israel—the stronger party 
it favored (Welton & Pruitt)—bolstering his “evenhanded” credentials with Arabs. 
“Before his stopover in London,” Rabin reflected, “the secretary of state—in his 
favorite though thin disguise as a ‘senior official’—briefed the journalist on the 
plane, who promptly informed the whole world that Israel’s hard line had, once 
again, led her to miss an opportunity.”119  Clawing back, America’s premier pro-
Israel lobby, AIPAC, circulated a letter signed by seventy-six Senators urging 
President Ford to resume foreign aid requests.120 Kissinger would later claim “a 
couple of senators called to reassure him, telling him to ignore the letter.”121  For 
his part, President Ford remembered “The letter… really bugged me… I was not 
going to capitulate to it.”122 Ford told the Israeli Ambassador the following: 
 
I want to work with the Prime Minister; I will work with him, but we have 
to move.  I do not think it useful to get into a political confrontation with 
the Jewish community in the United States… Any political activity would 
                                                        
117 “Memorandum of Conversation”, Prime Minister’s residence in Jerusalem, 
March 19, 1975 8:45-10:20 a.m, Vol 2, March 7-22, 1975, Kissinger Trip (5), 
NSA Kissinger Reports on Middle East, Ford Presidential Archives, 
(SECRET/NODIS/XGDS). 
118 Yitzak Rabin and Yoram Peri. The Rabin Memoirs. (California:  University of 
California Press, 1979), 261. 
119 Ibid.  
120 “Congress & the Middle East: Senate Letter Condemning President Ford on 
Blaming Israel for Peace Process Suspension”, Jewish Virtual Library, May 22, 
1975, Last Accessed on October 18, 2017. 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/senate-letter-condemning-president-ford-on-
blaming-israel-for-peace-process-suspension-may-1975. 
121 Aaron David Miller. The Much Too Promised Land. (New York: Bantom Dell, 
2008), 149. 
122 Ibid.  
39 
 
be very, very unhealthy.  It would not be good for your country, for my 
country and for our relationship.123  
 
Though the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement would take the form of an 
agreement that August, a key takeaway for the Israelis came via the extraction 
of two American presidential pledges in a single letter classified SECRET from 
Ford to Rabin on September 5, 1975.124  It gave the appearance of America’s 
diminishing ability to keep its pro-Israel bias in check during future mediation 
encounters:  
  
-Should the US desire in the future to put forward proposals of its own, it 
will make every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposals with a view to 
refraining from putting forth proposals that Israel would consider 
unsatisfactory. 125 
 
In addition, even though the letter came off the back of a second and unrelated 
Israeli-Egyptian deal, it betrayed the Syrians by prejudicing their rights afforded 
by UNSCR 242: 
 
- The US has not developed a final position on the borders.  Should it do 
so it will give great weight to Israel’s position that any peace agreement 
with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan 
Heights.126  
 
Negotiation over the letter—which the Arabs were never made aware of—took 
many weeks.  Upon finalizing the letter and presenting it to President Ford for 
signature, Kissinger had said of the experience:  
 
“I really came back with a bad taste about the Israelis.  They were 
treacherous, petty, deceitful—they didn’t treat us like allies.”127 
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2.2 Observations on Kissinger’s Mediation Bias:  
Perhaps owing to the passage of time, the attributes of Kissinger’s shuttle 
diplomacy have clearly found a home within the contemporary scholarly 
literature on mediation bias and conflict resolution, including champions of 
biased mediation like Saadia Touval.   At least initially, America’s pro-Israel bias 
did stimulate cooperation among Arab states, particularly Egypt, which sought 
to drive a wedge between the US and Israel (Touval).  US-Egyptian relations 
did improve drastically. Kissinger set as a goal the American ability to deliver 
Israeli concessions to the Arabs—i.e., acceptance of ceasefires, withdrawal 
from their occupied land based on international law and UN Resolutions 242 
and 338. In the end, Kissinger did demonstrate America’s ability to trade on its 
special relationship to convince Israel to do just that.   
 
Crucially, Kissinger moved beyond procedural niceties and resorted to more 
aggressive mediation, employing “directive strategies” (Bercovitch) and “power 
mediation” (Fisher) with all parties, but particularly with the Israelis, and 
especially where he thought Israeli intransigence would cause America to lose 
influence to the Soviets.  He threatened to walk out of talks, twice convinced the 
President of the United States—Nixon and Ford—to “reassess” the US-Israeli 
relationship, the latter even going so far as to withhold weapons and aid until 
Israelis became more reasonable.  Though biased, Kissinger was willing to 
blame Israel publicly, and did, in spite of the ire it drew and the political 
countermeasures Israel attempted.  Citing Fisher, Kissinger proved his utility by 
advocating on behalf of the weaker (Arab) parties rather than the strong party 
(Israel) that enjoyed America’s favor.   
 
Kissinger proved invaluable at the information sharing role (Kydd), providing 
Israelis and Arabs with accurate insights concerning one another.  Kissinger’s 
close relationship with Assad and Sadat allowed him to channel them during 
meetings with Israeli officials.  He did not act “more Israeli than the Israelis” (or 
more “royalist than the king,” citing Kydd) and was careful to guard against 
suggestions that he would advocate for Israel even if his personal views 
conflicted.  Lying in wait to trounce excessive American pro-Israel bias was the 
coordinated Arab oil embargo, a credible countermeasure to devastate the US 
economy.  
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Interestingly, in order to placate Israel for its withdrawal from Syrian and 
Egyptian lands, several parties were sacrificed.  The first was Jordan’s King 
Hussein, whose passive, non-belligerent posture and good clandestine relations 
with Israel worked against him.  The second was the Syrians who were also 
mortgaged behind closed doors during the second Sinai disengagement. Their 
future welfare was compromised in secret US-Israeli side letters favoring 
Israel’s retention of the Golan Heights (as it does to this day).  There could be 
some room for maneuver in those letters, and debate over enforceability for 
future US presidential administrations is valid.  But its memorializing in 
presidential letters set a precedent that would prejudice the minds of future 
American mediators.  Finally, the Palestinians, entirely absent from Kissinger’s 
1973 postwar agenda, suffered the most.   
 
In that regard, it is debatable whether, as Fisher cautions, the entire US 
mediation and intervention process became a sham for the stronger Israelis 
enjoying American bias.  On the one hand, in response to having its nose 
bloodied by war, Israel did make modest withdrawals from Egyptian and Syrian 
land it occupied in 1967 for the first time.  The negotiations also conditioned 
Israel to the fact it was ultimately obliged to fully leave Sinai, which it earlier 
claimed had religious significance; on the Golan, the Israelis could be forgiven 
for thinking otherwise because of the US side letters.  No, the evident sham was 
the exclusion of Palestinians, which meant their rights and suffering went 
unaddressed and the occupation of their lands were entrenched, which clearly 
benefited the Israelis.  Whether through personal bias, Cold War calculations or 
real politik (or some combination thereof), Kissinger did not believe a resolution 
between Israel and Jordan was possible at the time, and so in excluding them, 
placed their interests at a distinct disadvantage to Israel’s. 
 
2.3 Escalating US Mediation Bias from Clinton to Obama  
The Truth About Camp David and The Palestine Papers offer distinct historical 
contrast from the Kissinger era’s limited mediation successes.  The scholarly 
literature has yet to maturely integrate this recent period from my studies 
against previously held theoretical models on mediation bias.  Even still, one 
can confidently argue that US behavior in the period covered by my research 
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cannot be described as “biased” alone, at least not in keeping with the 
conditions described by Touval in Chapter 1.   
 
From Clinton to Obama—as both my publications show—gone were the “coldly 
focused… unsentimental pursuits of American strategic interests” demonstrated 
by Kissinger under Nixon and Ford.128 Directive diplomacy (Bercovitch) or 
power mediation (Fisher)—including a willingness to be tough with Israel whom 
it favored—was instead replaced by flaccid, procedural/facilitation tactics that 
for long periods lacked a final endgame. The Truth About Camp David further 
calls into question whether US mediation strategy was even truly American, as 
Clinton’s closest aides confided to me how the US president “allowed [Israeli 
Prime Minister Ehud] Barak to drive the process,” an astonishing outsourcing of 
US policy that for Palestinians more resembled an extra Israeli negotiator than a 
mere negotiator with bias.129   
 
Gone also were any American presidential threats to launch a “strategic 
reassessment” over Israel’s obstinacy.  And had any Administration, Republican 
or Democrat, dared to publicly criticize Israel before the Congress, it is at best 
speculative who US lawmakers would side with.  To the extent America did use 
directive/power mediation strategies, it was almost always channeled at the 
weaker Arabs, especially Palestinians, as pressuring Israel had become 
politically taboo.130 This is largely because from the 1970s to the 1990s, 
American diplomacy became unmoored from international legal standards 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, drifting steadily toward the whims of popular 
domestic political sentiments about Israel, and the whims of the incumbent 
Israeli Prime Minister.  By the time Bill Clinton arrived in office, pro-Israel bias 
                                                        
128 Dana Allin and Steven Simon. Our Separate Ways: The Struggle for the 
Future of the US-Israeli Alliance. (New York: Public Affairs, 2016), 41.   
129 Clayton E. Swisher. The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About 
the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process. (New York: Nation Books, 
2004), 33. 
130 One could argue that blaming or otherwise disparaging Palestinians and 
Arabs was an activity that, far from being cost free for US politicians, was 
actually a cheap way of gaining domestic political points. For negative media 
portrayal of this constituency predating the September 11, 2001 attacks, see: 
Jack Shaheen. Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People, Film, 
Directed by Jack Shaheen (2006). 
43 
 
was to become a cornerstone of American mediation.  In contrast to the 
experienced statesman President George HW Bush, who pressured Israel over 
continued illegal settlement construction by holding up loan guarantees, the 
incoming Bill Clinton was an ambitious politician and foreign policy neophyte 
who vowed to stop “pro-Arab bias” among US policymakers.131 As I chronicled 
in The Truth About Camp David, Clinton sought to remedy that through the 
employ of pro-Israel partisans Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk, each of whom 
took special interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict through their self-described 
“Jewish identity.”132 
 
Few advisors in recent decades would hold as great a sway over the course of 
US policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.  For Ross, the 1967 War “served as a 
crucible” for “forging” his “strong connection to Israel,” evoking his “great pride 
as a Jew” and paving the way for his “career” as a mediator.133  Indyk’s own 
affinity would develop in part while serving a stint volunteering to help Israel 
during the 1973 war.134 Friends but rivals, Ross and Indyk adopted similar 
postures, mediating the actual conflict itself while authoring pro-Israeli policy 
justifications for any domestic American doubters.  Their influence was a 
dominating, if not enduring, force, externally but also within the presidencies of 
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Clinton to Obama.135  In 2015, Ross himself boasted he was “at the center of 
Middle East policy in four administrations, including with President Obama” 
while “shaping the US-Israeli partnership” by “working closely with every Israeli 
prime Minister…on every aspect of policy.”136  An official biographer records 
Clinton “picked up most of his outlook from Dennis Ross” whom he considered 
among “the best people in the world on the issue.”137   Clinton himself would 
fete Ross with a 2007 book jacket testimonial as “one of our country’s best 
practitioners of statecraft,” a staggering claim considering in all Ross’s time as 
America’s mediator from 1989-2001 (as well as a 2009-2011 cameo return) he 
personally concluded one single agreement: the 1997 Hebron Protocol.138 
Interestingly, it is that deal in particular that helped legitimize Israeli settlements, 
sanctioning Israeli control over the Old City, and putting Hebron on the path of 
apartheid rather than coexistence.139  Following this negotiation, Ross claimed 
“We were much more than facilitators. We were not mediators. We were 
brokers.  In the long run, my own personal judgment is it is better for us to play 
the supporting facilitating role than the brokering role.”140   
 
In substance, it must be said that the United States itself committed to being an 
honest broker at all times during Ross’s employ, starting with Secretary of State 
James Baker, who pledged in a 1991 Letter of Assurance to the Palestinian 
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side following the Madrid talks that “The United States will act as an honest 
broker in trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.”141  Even as Ross remained 
through the transition of administrations from Bush Sr to Clinton, its new 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher—who Ross also reported to—was quick 
to reaffirm that approach, committing the United States to “play an active role as 
facilitator, honest broker, good offices, bridging gaps and asking difficult 
questions of the parties.”142 Throughout the ensuing Oslo process subsequent 
Clinton Administration officials would repeatedly reaffirm America’s claim of 
“honest broker” status.143  
 
Ross, the point man to embody that directive—however aspirational—once 
described it in a more caveated way: “the United States has a special 
relationship with Israel. That doesn’t mean we can’t be an honest broker.”144 A 
scrutiny of other public statements by Ross provides further evidence of his 
awareness of his own bias towards Israel, such as “my approach to the peace 
process was shaped by the conviction that Israel must feel secure if it was to 
take risks for peace.”145  The American’s preoccupation with putting Israeli 
security concerns first confirms this bias.  In rationalizing it, Ross dangles the 
prospect of delivery, echoing the language of Touval: “because we have the 
relationship with the Israelis, who do you think is the one trying to move the 
Israelis?  It’s the US, and that’s been the case throughout.”146  
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Indeed, whether consciously or not, Ross mimics aspects of Touval when 
expressing that “having a special relationship with Israel is not inconsistent with 
producing peace. It may be a prerequisite for producing peace”147  
 
Yet other proclamations by Ross suggest the Touval model of mediation bias 
would never be applicable in a strict sense.  For example, when Ross asserts 
that “peacemaking required that the Arabs understand that no wedge would be 
driven between the US and Israel,”148 he clearly upends Touval’s formulation 
that cooperation will follow when disputants in a three-way bargain face the 
possible defection of a mediator from its favored party to the least favored 
one.149  
 
Traditionally viewed as more liberal than Ross, and more personally aligned 
with Israel’s Labor Party, Indyk also affirmed America’s commitment of “being 
the honest broker and full partner, not only to Israel, but also to the 
Palestinians.”150  Recalling his time in Israel during the 1973 War decades later, 
Indyk remarked how “in those dark days…I witnessed how…Henry Kissinger 
brokered a cease-fire that ended the war and paved the way for peace between 
Israel and Egypt.”151  Indyk certainly appeared to share Kissinger’s bias and 
personal affinity for Israel.  But he failed in taking affirmative steps to offset that 
bias among Arabs, which Kissinger did through even-handed performance.  
Again, Indyk’s concept of “honest broker’ came with devastating caveats.  As I 
cited in The Truth About Camp David, in 1998 Indyk would tell Jewish-
Americans words meant to assuage them: that “evenhandedness is not even in 
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our lexicon.”152  Not to prove hypocritical, Indyk dispensed the same unpleasant 
truth to a mostly Arab audience one year later:  “I didn’t say we were 
evenhanded.  And it’s not a word I use myself.  We are certainly pro-peace, and 
we’re certainly pro-Israel, and we’re certainly pro-Palestinian when it comes to 
supporting the peace process.”153 
 
As Indyk lacked any demonstrated international conflict resolution before joining 
the Clinton Administration, it is unclear what led him—a self-professed student 
and admirer of Kissinger—to dispense the even-handed component that was 
requisite to Kissinger’s success. A revelation from one of the most recent 
comprehensive studies sheds valuable light on Clinton’s possible intentions in 
drafting Indyk straight from AIPAC into the White House, where he would serve 
in various capacities from 1993-2001.   As captured in the 2013 book by Kurtzer 
et al., a senior AIPAC staffer confided that while Indyk eschewed the reputation 
of being AIPAC’s “man on the inside,” Clinton responded, “Are you kidding us?  
It benefits me to have him as AIPAC’s candidate.”154  This would seem to 
suggest that, just as Nixon tried to use Kissinger, Clinton would trade on Indyk 
for political perks with America’s powerful pro-Israeli constituents, many of 
whom are Democrat voting Jewish-Americans.  This would further reveal, citing 
Fisher, “devious objectives” in the negotiation—only in this instance, by the 
mediator himself rather than either of the warring parties—as Clinton appeared 
to suggest Indyk’s pro-Israeli presence in the US-led negotiations was 
engineered to boost him in domestic political polls.   
 
Indyk would again resurface for a single year (2013-14) in the latter years of the 
Obama Administration as Special Middle East Envoy, this time—in perhaps a 
rhetorical nod to harsh criticisms—he promised the Palestinians that the US 
would not impose on them again: “we would not coordinate with the Israelis and 
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agree with the Israelis in advance.”155 Demonstrating another problematic 
aspect of Indyk’s personal bias, his closeness to Israel’s Labor Party did little to 
win credibility with incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his 
hawkish right-wing government, who largely marginalized him (then US 
Ambassador to Israel, Indyk’s open support for Israel’s Labour party in the 
1990’s resulted in him being returned to Washington after Netanyahu’s electoral 
victory as Likud prime minister, as I described in The Truth About Camp 
David).156  Years later, Indyk would finish this second mediator stint just as his 
first: empty handed without brokering a single agreement for anyone.  Being 
close to liberal sectors of Israeli political society, it turns out, did little to help 
Indyk “deliver” Netanyahu’s increasingly hawkish, right-wing government 
coalitions in negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.  
 
Dennis Ross also formally re-emerged in the Obama Administration from 2009-
2011, having nurtured his contacts with Israel’s right-wing politicians even 
further during his “off” years from government service.  During that interregnum, 
Ross witnessed the expansion of his own family ties to Israel while heading a 
Jerusalem-based Zionist think tank originally founded by the Jewish Agency of 
Israel.157 Initially wary of Ross’s track record on Israeli-Palestinian peace, 
Obama brought Ross on although initially relegating him away from Palestine  
to the Iran issue, a matter of strong concern, especially amongst US supporters 
of Israel. The Middle East Envoy job went to retired Senator George Mitchell, a 
heavyweight politician and former judge renowned for successfully brokering 
the Northern Ireland peace agreements.  
 
When Mitchell ran into political problems with the Netanyahu government, Ross 
quietly deployed to “assure Jerusalem” that team Obama was “committed to 
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Israel’s security and well-being.”158 Ross resurfaced in October 2009 transcripts 
from The Palestine Papers as he met with Saeb Erekat at the White House, in 
spite of the negotiations being the remit of Senator Mitchell, who was not 
present.159  Ross’s outreach to both Palestinians and Israelis would mark the 
beginning of Ross’s encroachment on what was supposed to be Mitchell’s turf.  
Their tensions became obvious to everyone; neither would succeed in their 
missions.   
 
Steven Simon, who served Obama as Senior Director for the Middle East and 
North Africa at the National Security Council, writes that “The Israelis were in a 
uniquely advantageous position of being able to choose their American 
interlocutor.”160  Just as they had under the Clinton years, the Israelis turned to 
Ross for special treatment.  For example, in 2010, Ross advised Obama on a 
political and security deal for Israel and advocated exchanging the release of 
convicted spy Jonathan Pollard and giving Israel a squadron of America’s most 
advance fighter aircraft—the F-35, costing $330 million per plane—for a two 
month freeze on building new settlements.161 While having a continuum of the 
same US mediators (Kydd) clearly benefited Israel, who received Ross and 
Indyk’s bias, it disadvantaged the disfavored Palestinian as the accrual of trust 
instead became their accrual of distrust in America.  An astounding confession 
from Simon’s book includes the acknowledgement that “the United States under 
Obama did continue to act as ‘Israel’s lawyers’—that is, mediating on the 
principle that Israel must be satisfied and the Palestinians convinced,”162 
precisely the circumstances Beber warned against in his critique of biased 
mediation.163   
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2.4 Biased Mediator or “Israel’s Lawyer”? 
“Israel’s lawyer” references a jarring May 2005 headline that appeared in the 
establishment Washington Post’s op-ed pages.  Its author was Aaron David 
Miller, a PhD historian turned diplomat who had recently departed from the 
State Department after serving as Ross’s deputy for a number of years.  “For far 
too long,” Miller wrote, “many American officials involved in Arab-Israeli 
peacemaking, myself included, have acted as Israel’s attorney, catering and 
coordinating with the Israelis at the expense of successful peace 
negotiations.”164  Expressing both consciousness and frustration with US 
mediation bias toward Israel, Miller went on to attest how the US lost “sight of 
the need to be advocates for both Arabs and Israelis.”165  With Palestinians, 
Miller confessed the US “departure point was not what was needed to reach an 
agreement acceptable to both sides but what would pass with only one —
Israel.”166  On Camp David 2000, Miller plainly admits “we ended up advocating 
Israel’s positions before, during, and after the summit.”167 Harkening to recent 
history, including Kissinger’s efforts, Miller concludes “when we have used our 
diplomacy wisely and functioned as advocates and lawyers for both sides, we 
have succeeded.”168 In 2016, Ross would remove whatever ambiguity remained 
over his preferred client, telling a gathering of American Jews his belief that 
“[p]lenty of others have been advocates for the Palestinians.  We don’t need to 
be advocates for the Palestinians.  We need to be advocates for Israel.”169  This 
would, in fact, suggest Ross believes that being Israel’s lawyer is the correct 
form of mediation bias.   
  
While Miller’s article corroborated and even advanced beyond his earlier 
criticisms presented in The Truth About Camp David, it was another 
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Washington Post article years after that inspired me to undertake this essay on 
biased mediation.  I am referring to a 2008 obituary of Professor Saadia Touval, 
whose colorful life was recalled as beginning in the once-outlawed Jewish 
paramilitary group Haganah and led to academia where he served as an Israeli 
university dean, apparently educating certain American diplomats. Its mundane 
title, “Saadia Touval, 76, Expert on Mediation Issues,” gave away little but the 
body of the article yielded intriguing detail.  “His work on ‘biased 
intermediaries,’” read the obituary, “had an impact on prominent U.S. 
negotiators such as Aaron David Miller and Dennis Ross, who borrowed his 
ideas.”170   The obituary quoted Miller heaping praise on Touval for coming up 
with “a reasonable and compelling look at theory for practitioners” and 
developing “a very practical approach that was of great benefit to me.” Ross 
quoted Touval’s scholarship in his own book on statecraft171 and at his frequent 
public speaking engagements, makes comments that, at a minimum, sound 
inspired, if not influenced by, Touval’s biased mediation scholarship. Yet in a 
series of interviews for a 2002 academic journal, Ross claimed his own 
negotiation techniques were “intuitive and derived from experience, and that he 
was not particularly influenced by any specific theory current in the 
mediation/negotiation literature.”172 If true this would suggest Ross, like Indyk, 
freelanced and came up with their own untested approach—getting the “bias” 
part right but failing to bring other key back-end aspects that are expected, 
including “delivery” of the favored side and allowing for the potential of a wedge 
to be formed in the special relationship.    
 
What resulted was a mutation that defies tidy scholarly classification. 
Juxtaposing Touval’s scholarship aside the performance of Ross and his team 
in The Truth About Camp David more broadly, the many departures from the 
complete package of biased mediation articulated by Touval become evident.  
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Indeed, American mediator bias towards Israel during the Ross/Indyk era has 
far more in common with Miller’s version of “Israel’s lawyer” than it does with 
Touval’s scholarship on biased mediation.  At various points, the approach of 
Ross and Indyk go into further permutations of fringe biased mediation 
categories including Kydd’s “more royalist than the king” (or Powell’s “agent 
provocateur”), as critiqued by the former PLO Foreign Minister in The Truth 
About Camp David: 
 
Ambassadors Ross and Indyk were viewed by everybody as being 
partial, biased, pro-Israel, and they sometimes defended Israel much 
more than the Israelis delegates did.  In fact, we always thought that 
anything good about the peace process we got out of the Israelis when 
Dennis Ross was looking the other way.”173  
 
To be sure, Ross, Indyk and later serving US mediators certainly had the pro-
Israel “bias” credentials.  But Touvalian they were not.  No Palestinian or Syrian 
could ever “hope to drive a wedge” between the US and Israel, as Touval 
hypothesized, especially when US support for Israel reached new rhetorical 
heights with multiple pronouncements, made from most every level of the US 
political establishment—Republican and Democrat—that such “daylight” with 
Israel would never be tolerated.174   
 
Conspicuously absent too is Touval’s key benefit for Arabs accepting biased US 
mediation—America’s presumed ability to deliver the Israelis.175  For 
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Palestinians, despite every US President from Lyndon Johnson demanding an 
end to settlement expansion, continued growth of settlements demonstrates the 
perverse fallacy of American political will to “deliver” Israel.176  The Americans 
could stop the expansion of settlements, if it had the political will, by imposing 
significant costs on the Israelis until it stopped.  But instead they found an 
enabler of settlements amongst the very top American mediator, who at best 
presented a “yellow” light on the topic, if not a “green” one through his silence.  
In The Truth About Camp David, senior US diplomat Toni Verstandig told me 
when it came to criticizing settlements, Dennis Ross was “the most 
uncomfortable…[Ross] felt we couldn’t diminish our leverage with Israel if we 
came out and publicly criticized what he believed was catering to constituencies 
in Israel.”177  Left with a free hand to build as many settlements on stolen 
Palestinian land as possible, this reflects what Fisher described as “devious 
objectives,” as Israel purposefully manipulated negotiations to bide time and 
improve its own territorial gain with American acquiescence.     
 
For Syrians, although the US claimed for years to be the political repository of 
“Rabin’s deposit” of a full return to the June 4, 1967 lines, that delivery never 
proved forthcoming, even as the late Hafez al-Assad repeatedly offered normal 
and full peaceful relations in exchange.178  Later, as the George W Bush 
Administration flirted with regime change in Damascus, the new Syrian 
President, together with representatives of the Israeli government began to look 
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to the Turks and even Swiss for mediation.179  For its part, the US-aid 
dependent Palestinian Authority appeared to recognize that Touval’s 
description of “biased mediator” is not on the American offing, and as shown in 
The Palestine Papers, doubled down on biased American mediation—knowing 
that it resembles more “Israel’s lawyer” and at times even “more royalist than 
the king.”  Although given shrinking territory available for a viable, contiguous, 
Palestinian state, there are signs they too are waking up to the reality of an 
American emperor that has no clothes.  In 2015 when the US Congress cut the 
Palestinian Authority’s annual $400 million dollars in aid over its decision to 
peacefully and lawfully contest Israel’s conduct in recent campaigns against 
Gaza, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas confided doubt over Secretary 
John Kerry, then mediating the talks: “If Kerry can’t get me $400 million dollars, 
how will he get me East Jerusalem?”180   
 
Touval would also have us believe that Israel would try and preserve its favored 
position with America to prevent Arab encroachment.  However true that might 
have been in the 1970s, in recent years it is only episodically so, exacerbated 
by the decline of American influence worldwide.  One example is following 
Israel’s subterfuge at Geneva and Camp David summits in 2000, when Barak 
prevailed on the US to take Israel’s side and blame the Arabs for the failure.  
Another is when Ariel Sharon reeled Bush back into Israel’s fold by warning him 
Israel would not be treated as a throwback to 1930s “Czechoslovakia” in Bush’s 
post September 11th bid to shore up an Arab coalition to “fight terrorism.”181  By 
2011, the widening rift in US-Israeli drift became perceptible, if not purposeful.  
A White House official recalled a presentation in Jerusalem by Israel’s then 
foreign minister, who warned Israel might go off and chart its own course with a 
“new alliance involving Russia, China, India, and other countries,” a move 
reflecting Israel’s “deep disdain for the encumbrances, especially regarding the 
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Palestinians, that Washington attaches to its support.”182  Israel has defied the 
US time and again, sending its Prime Minister to humiliate and rebuke President 
Obama in 2015 over the Iran nuclear deal.183  An indicator of just how much the 
power asymmetry has changed: at the time of this writing certain Arab 
dictatorships have largely come to believe that only Israel can deliver the 
Americans rather than the opposite. In spite of their differences over the 
Palestinian question, they quietly look to Israel for help, especially the US 
Congress, on topics ranging from adopting anti-Iran policies to cutting slack on 
Arab human rights abuses to supporting crackdowns against the Muslim 
Brotherhood.184    
 
  
                                                        
182 Dana Allin and Steven Simon, Our Separate Ways: The Struggle for the 
Future of the US-Israeli Alliance. (New York: Public Affairs, 2016), 214.   
183 Seumas Milne, Ewen MacAskill and Clayton Swisher, “Leaked Cables show 
Netanyahu’s Iran bomb claim contradicted by Mossad.” Guardian Published on: 
February 23, 2015, Last Accessed on: October 17, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/23/leaked-spy-cables-netanyahu-
iran-bomb-mossad. 
184 John Hudson. “Egypt’s Rules Have A New Friend in DC: The Israel Lobby”, 
Foreign Policy, Published on August 19, 2013, Last Accessed on October 18, 
2017. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/19/egypts-rulers-have-a-new-friend-in-dc-the-
israel-lobby/. 
56 
 
PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS 
 
3.1 Neither Honest Broker, Nor Effective Broker  
What about other benefits that US biased mediation might bring?  Seldom did 
the US provide Israel with accurate insights about Arab resolve that Israel did 
not know already or better understand themselves. One reason why these 
partisan mediators lacked a deep understanding of the Arabs was the fact they 
did not seem to enjoy good relations with either the elder Assad (who had good 
relations with Kissinger) or Arafat. As The Truth About Camp David details, 
mutual enmity between Ross and Arafat and Ross and Assad was well 
established.185  The broader US mediaton team was also culturally ignorant 
about Arabs and Islam.  As later confirmed in The Peace Puzzle, a devastating 
2013 critique of American mediation based on more than 120 experts 
interviewed, “expertise that Ross and his staff held on Israel was not matched 
by a corresponding expertise or experience with Palestinian, Arab, or Islamic 
needs.”186 In the run up to Jordan’s 1994 peace agreement with Israel, a former 
Jordanian foreign minister recalled how “King Hussein did not trust Ross at all” 
and that was “why Hussein did not want to tell the United States about his 
moves with Israel.”187  Israelis at Camp David recalled Arafat’s dislike of Ross, 
as one remembered “Arafat said once or twice to Clinton that Ross and others 
on the US team were ‘working for the Israelis, not for you.”188  For his part, Ross 
recalled avoiding a meeting between Clinton and Arafat:  “I feared that I might 
lose my cool with Arafat. I had had it with him.”189  Leaving aside that Ross was 
an unelected presidential appointee and that Arafat was a democratically 
elected leader representing a presumptive state in the making, the anecdote 
reflects less the presence of discipline on Ross’s part and more how great was 
the chasm between this mediator’s relations and emotions with the single 
consequential Palestinian at a momentous summit.  As one American official in 
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The Peace Puzzle states “Clinton was so goddamn ill-advised by the people 
around him, it is sickening.”190  The book adds “The American team had no full 
appreciation for Palestinian domestic politics and, somewhat surprisingly no full 
understanding of Israeli politics.”191 According to Kydd’s standards, this would 
render the same “American team” incapable of eliminating uncertainty about the 
resolve of the other party.  If it understands neither’s bottom lines well, who 
exactly is it in a position to advise?  
 
It is particularly remarkable, if not counterintuitive, that biased American 
mediators failed to accurately understand Israeli bottom lines and strategy, 
which Palestinians expected it to know best.  Instead, the US was left musing 
alongside Palestinians over Israel’s true intentions and next moves. The US 
also, as seen in The Truth About Camp David, lacked even basic mastery of the 
core conflict details to prove useful to either side.  An Israeli negotiator 
complained to me how “The American team didn’t know the substance;” adding 
to this handicap, Aaron David Miller lamented how “The Israelis and 
Palestinians came very prepared to Camp David—the problem was, we 
didn’t.”192  
 
My revelation of this general ignorance among US mediators further cast doubts 
on its overall suitability to reliably filter information amongst the parties.    
According to Kydd, if either Ross or Indyk had information that the Arabs had 
steely resolve on an issue, in order to be useful they must accurately convey 
that to Israel.  That, in turn, might hypothetically incline—but not guarantee—
Israel toward making a concession. On the other hand, if Ross and Indyk 
believed the Arabs were not resolved, they would urge the Israelis to not make 
a concession, and if the Arab side actually was resolved the conflict would 
continue. Consider how badly both failed on this score with respect to 
conveying Hafez al-Assad’s unbroken resolve to reclaim every inch of the Golan 
Heights right up to the Sea of Galilee, as detailed in Chapter Eight of The Truth 
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About Camp David and reconfirmed in scholarly works subsequent to mine.193 
Consider also how this logic played out at Camp David 2000 with Jerusalem as 
an example. International law (UNSCR 242) protects Palestinian legal claims for 
Israel to end its occupation of East Jerusalem, including Al Aqsa 
Mosque/Temple Mount.  It was the most important item of the many issues to 
be negotiated at Camp David, an obsession of Arafat’s, who was quoted 
admitting before his death how “had they given me Al-Quds (Jerusalem) and 
the Al-Aqsa Mosque, I would have given them everything.”194  Though Arafat 
showed incredible flexibility at Camp David 2000—such as agreeing to the 
principle of land swaps—neither Ross nor Indyk understood, much less 
conveyed to Israel, Arafat’s resolve on Jerusalem.  
 
On the contrary, because Ross and Indyk were excessively partisan on the 
subject—pro-Israel but also religiously and emotionally attached as Jews to the 
Zionist narrative—part of Camp David 2000 was wasted while they and other 
soul-searching American negotiators—almost exclusively Jewish—went through 
a process of self-discovery and contemplation on what they could subjectively 
accept on Jerusalem as Jews, rather than what diplomats representing the 
United States should do in accordance with international law (UN Resolution 
242). At least for Ross, doing so would require walking back public declarations 
he had made as early as 1989, when he opined that “an independent 
Palestinian state is economically not going to be viable and it may also be a 
source of instability” and other statements like “[s]elf-determination in a Middle 
Eastern context has come to mean one thing: an independent Palestinian state.  
And our position… is that an independent Palestinian state in our view is not a 
prescription for a stable and enduring settlement.”195 
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For Indyk’s part, when Barak contemplated dividing the Old City, rather than 
encouraging him to continue and fulfill Israel’s legal obligations of returning 
occupied Palestinian land, he expressed disbelief if not opposition.  Shlomo 
Ben Ami, Israel’s foreign minister recalled “walking in the fields with Martin 
Indyk that night and both of us saying that Ehud was nuts.”196  Indyk 
corroborated that exchange in his 2009 memoir how “personally, I considered 
Barak’s offer a mistake; he was going too far too fast.”197  This is particularly 
striking given the American’s had framed Camp David as a “make or break” 
summit to make final decisions.  In this instance, citing Kydd, Indyk became 
“more royalist than the King” (citing Powell, “agent provocateur”) preferring 
Israel make a smaller offer even when its favored side was willing to make 
bigger ones — and in spite of the fact that this would contribute to the lack of a 
conflict-ending agreement that all believed would probably lead to renewed war 
(as it did in the summits aftermath with the Second Intifada). Citing Beber, Indyk 
was not just biased to want an agreement allocating as much as possible to his 
preferred disputant, Israel; Indyk actually wanted Israel to offer less at that 
moment in time than what Barak was willing to do.    
 
Indyk was hardly alone in becoming “more royalist than the King” at Camp 
David; Dennis Ross would also earn this distinction. Prior to Barak’s offer to 
divide portions of Jerusalem, Ross recalls telling Indyk, “We’d better think of 
ways to compensate Palestinians for what they won’t be able to get from the 
Israelis on Jerusalem,” going on to suggest as a “big symbol for Arafat” that 
they would say “the American embassy will be built in the part of Abu Dis that 
extends into the current municipal boundary of East Jerusalem.”198 Later, while 
discussing territorial percentages, Ross notes that some amongst his team 
believed the Palestinians were entitled to full territorial compensation under 
international law.  “I disagreed,” Ross writes,  
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I was not focused on reconciling rights but on addressing needs…I 
believed it was possible for the Palestinians to have territorial contiguity 
and viability with 7 percent (Israeli) annexation…I felt strongly about 6 to 
7 percent annexation, and I was not prepared to lower the ceiling.  Nor 
was I prepared to introduce the idea of an equivalent swap.199    
 
Indeed, subsequent Israeli and even American proposals would greatly improve 
the territorial percentage well beyond what Ross had initially felt “prepared” in 
the summer of 2000 to offer.  Another instance of “more royalist than the King” 
mediation by Ross is recounted in his own words. Just prior to issuing the 
Clinton Parameters in December 2000, he recalled meeting Mohammed Dahlan 
to assure him that on territory “Israelis will not go below 7 percent annexation.  
You can get 95 percent of the territory with a 2 percent swap but you will not do 
better than that.”200  Later that day, Ross learns the Israelis had, in fact, done 
far better minutes before him, “accepting 5 percent annexation.”201  Rather than 
being supportive of Israel for continuing to show flexibility and move in the 
direction of fulfilling its international legal obligations, Ross acknowledges being  
 
stunned and angry…I was furious.  What was the point of my conveying 
a tough posture of issues of supposed principle to the Israeli side if they 
were simply going to undercut me?202 
 
Addressing the arbitrary adjudication of what Ross perceives were Palestinian 
“needs,” Norman Finkelstein writes, “What is most peculiar about Ross’s 
argument is his apparent belief that his personal adjudication is less arbitrary 
than reference to a consensual body of laws.  Leaving aside the strange 
premise that the transitory opinion of one should count for more than the 
received opinion of many, it is unclear what qualifies Ross for the role of 
philosopher-King.”203  
 
The Truth About Camp David discussed the Israeli ability to ensure US 
mediation bias in the period surrounding the summit—including Barak’s 
connections to Clinton’s pollsters and assisting Hillary Clinton in securing the 
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New York Jewish community in her bid for US Senate.204  But from the period 
stretching through both my publications, the broader Arab world became 
feckless at equalizing American bias. Long gone were the Gulf Arab states use 
of oil embargoes as a means of keeping American bias in check (Welton & 
Pruitt).205 Arab states lacked “high power” over biased American mediators to 
affect their future welfare, and to the extent any power was exerted in protest of 
American Mideast policy, it was often expressed through violence by so-called 
terrorist groups (and with covert acquiescence by some Arab states) whose 
tactics were roundly condemned. Citing Touval, neither Ross, Indyk, or any 
other policy partisans that came after sought to take steps to safeguard their 
continued acceptability to both sides.  They were never realistically going to 
lose their jobs because of Arab complaints, even on the odd occasions when 
they made them privately and even sometimes publicly.206   
 
The Truth About Camp David evidences years of Arab complaints about Ross’s 
excessive bias—including to the White House and President himself.  Only at 
the very end of the Clinton presidency did the White House begin to entertain if 
those complaints had merit, concluding even then that it was far too late to do 
anything meaningful about it, a factor compounded by how bureaucratically 
central to the process Ross had made himself.207 Citing Kydd, the lack of US 
mediator accountability denied Palestinians another countermeasure to offset 
US bias as the mediators would never face the prospect of being replaced after 
vouching for promises made by the Israelis, who would only later breach.  The 
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failure to be accountable after falsely vouching for Israel was evident throughout 
The Truth About Camp David, and included breaches of Arab confidences not 
just by Ross or Indyk but by President Clinton himself.  For example, in the 
March 8, 2000 agreement when Clinton promised Arafat that Barak would make 
good on his pledge to lessen Israel’s occupation of 3 West Bank villages, which 
Barak quickly reneged upon; when Clinton inveigled Assad to attend the 
Geneva summit based on supplying Israeli withdrawal to the June 4th 1967 
lines, which never materialized; or, more blatantly, when Clinton pledged to 
Arafat in the presence of many that the United States would not under any 
circumstances blame Palestinians if the Camp David summit failed.   
 
Over time, the repeated betrayal of Arabs ultimately began to harm America’s 
preferred client.  As the US proved incapable at Camp David of “delivering” 
Palestinians, Israel’s top negotiator lamented in my book how “we Israelis have 
sacrificed a lot of our positions because of that biased tag that was put on 
Dennis Ross and on others…Arafat used to say to Clinton, “These guys are 
working for the Israelis, not for you!”208  Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, the former IDF 
Chief of Staff who also negotiated at the summit on Israel’s behalf echoed that 
sentiment, saying: 
  
It would have helped the Americans to be more trusted by the 
Palestinians.  The Palestinians lost trust through time.  They look at the 
Americans as an Israeli agent.  But they had no choice.  They could go 
nowhere.209 
 
This is partly because successive US presidents clearly believed the negative 
diplomatic externalities they created by betraying or belittling Arabs were minor 
compared to the domestic political benefits of being seen as siding with Israel.  
An impassioned rant by the Palestinians lead negotiator in The Palestine 
Papers records this frustration: 
 
That’s it.  Nineteen years.  We delivered on our Road Map obligations.  
Even Yuval Diskin raises his hat on security.  But no, they can’t even 
give a six-month freeze to give me a fig leaf to see, to find out, what we 
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can do…on swaps, but no.  You don’t see me in the same ship.  Your 
focus in on PR, quick news, and we’re cost free.  You know my word is 
nothing compared to you, in Congress.  What good am I if I’m the joke of 
my wife, I’m so weak.”210   
  
Like legions of politicians throughout history, short term domestic political 
expediency proved more attractive than the long-term principle of justice and 
peace internationally; the politically inexpensive former is nowadays preferred 
by pollsters while the politically costly latter is often what makes history.  
 
As I show in The Palestine Papers, the asymmetrical rift between Israelis and 
Palestinians only widened post 9/11, where the Palestinian Authority worked 
hard to distance itself from the Western “terrorist” label by bending over 
backwards to demonstrate security cooperation with Israel, including killing 
fellow Palestinians.211  Not unlike Oslo, which descended into a procedural 
sham (Fisher) that enabled the stronger Israelis to manipulate the process in 
order to build more “facts on the ground”, the George W Bush team did its part 
to further this fraud through its 2002 “Roadmap”, a document that pledged a 
Palestinian state by 2005. Validating Beber, it is also noteworthy how the US 
self-selected into the mediation role between Israelis and Palestinians again, 
given not only the lack of recent success but also upon belief by the Bush 
Administration that the efforts of the Clinton team were an unmitigated disaster, 
in part because they were not biased toward Israel enough.  According to 
Bush’s Treasury Secretary, in their first meeting on the topic Bush made clear 
“We are going to correct the imbalances of the previous administration on the 
Mideast conflict. We’re going to tilt it back to Israel.”212 Bush would later soften 
that stance and re-engage, although for calculated strategic reasons:  the US 
sought to build a coalition to go to “fight terror” and wage war against Iraq.213  
Key allies, including Britain, insisted the US “do something” diplomatically about 
Palestine to lessen their domestic criticism against further upending the Middle 
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East in conflict and bloodshed.  To provide the window dressing of mediation, 
as I write in The Palestine Papers, from 2001-2011 the US dispatched a cycle 
of hyperactive envoys—including an ambassador, 6 generals, and one CIA 
director, all obsessed with helping first and foremost quiet attacks against 
Israelis with little concurrent concern for Palestinian safety.214  Yet again, the 
US went to work like a corrupt auditor assisting an embezzler, ensuring Israel 
maximized its territorial gains at the expense of Palestinians, giving symbolic 
hope to Palestinians and solid guarantees for Israel’s security.  
 
From the outset, officials serving the George W. Bush Administration were told 
the new aim would be for conflict management rather than peacemaking, a 
paradigm that disadvantages the weaker Palestinian side.215 They, in turn, were 
expected to endure more years of land theft and occupation until it ostensibly 
elected a leadership of America’s liking.216  Even when they did so, a new round 
of excuses emerged to justify their occupied status.  The key driver of this was 
White House Senior Advisor Elliot Abrams, another pro-Israeli partisan known 
for his hawkish, Likud party views.  Although George W Bush explicitly 
embraced a Palestinian state in the UN Security Council for the first time in 
2002, Abrams would claim how Bush thought it would be “immoral” to “replace 
Israeli occupation with another typical Arab tyranny;” thus, “the nature of the 
Palestinian state was now a greater priority than its territory.”217   
There is evidence Abram’s claim that Palestinian reform must proceed freedom 
was a procedural sham to buy Israel more time to consolidate its hold on 
territory. While briefing Abrams in 2005 on ways to improve Palestinian 
connectivity in its future sovereignty, Simon recalls how Abrams “observed, 
perhaps just a bit mischievously, that ‘there isn’t going to be a Palestinian state’” 
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even though it was stated policy at the time.218   Indeed, a key innovation during 
Abram’s shepherding of this “conflict management” phase was the addition of 
“recognizing Israel as a Jewish state” as a condition on Palestinians.  Instead of 
addressing the longstanding core issues of borders, security, Jerusalem, and 
refugees, Israel and its partisans in the Bush Administration had them instead 
dedicate much time and diplomatic bandwidth debating whether to accept a 
humiliating claim required of no other state on the planet.  Of course, the raising 
of such a new condition in this midst of this patently shambolic process had its 
desired effect of diverting attention from areas where Israeli concessions were 
expected and demanded.   
 
Although a later push for negotiations happened at Annapolis in 2008, making 
notable progress, they almost always occurred in bilateral Israeli-Palestinian 
meetings where American mediators were absent.  The US gave a commitment 
to mediate, then exempted themselves from mediating, strangely, allowing the 
parties themselves to breathe life into discussion ostensibly free, at least 
momentarily, of American bias.    
 
For its part, the US has engaged in Leadership Selection Intervention (citing 
Weinberg), throughout the Oslo peace process and beyond219 to elect an Israeli 
Prime Minister it believes will be most forthcoming in a peace process, which is 
no doubt by some Israeli politicians considered a hostile act of foreign 
interference.  The Truth About Camp David lays out how Clinton overtly tried 
and failed to see Peres elected over Netanyahu in 1995.220  That was not lost 
on Netanyahu, who went on to have terrible relations with Clinton throughout 
his Administration.  Similarly, my research details how the US tried and 
succeeded in electing Ehud Barak over Netanyahu in 1999 but failed to see his 
re-election following Camp David 2000.221  Its obsession with helping Barak 
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succeed politically echoed the Bush Administration’s desire to see Ehud Olmert 
succeed, as shown in The Palestine Papers, including American requests of 
Palestinian officials to help make gestures to politically benefit Olmert. Meddling 
is bi-directional too, at least between Israel and the US (Palestinians have no 
domestic American political leverage), as the Israelis continue to have high 
power over any American president’s future political welfare, particularly 
through the Congress where such influence is made easy by lax campaign 
finance laws and special interest groups.  Toward Palestinians, the US also 
worked assiduously, with Israel’s Mossad taking lead, in a global campaign to 
discredit and isolate Palestinian President Yasser Arafat.  Former Mossad 
director Ephraim Halevy boasts in his 2006 memoir how  
 
…from the very beginning my blueprint for forging a new Palestinian 
leadership was a direct attempt to effect a regime change in a key player, 
a key adversary, of Israel…This was not a clandestine effort to pull 
strings.  It was an up-front campaign designed to gain public support and 
not simply endorsement of a concept, but an actual precise list of 
measures designed to obtain the desired result.222  
 
Following Arafat’s suspicious 2004 death,223 the US and Israel found a reform-
first compliant Palestinian President in the form of Mahmoud Abbas and the 
American educated Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad.  Once installed, the US 
knew how to exert levers over Abbas and Fayyad to buy their complaisance, 
occasionally playing them off each other. Driving home that point in The 
Palestine Papers is the caution given by one of the fleeting biased mediators 
sent by President Bush, US General Keith Dayton:  “As much as President 
Bush  thinks Abu Mazen is important,” Dayton told his Palestinian interlocuters, 
“without Fayyad, the US will lift its hand from the PA and give up on Abu 
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Mazen.”224  Owing to substantial aid and financial assistance it gives each year 
to the Palestinian Authority, that is no idle threat.  The US is uniquely positioned 
to coerce the Palestinian Authority to follow its instructions through the 
negotiations—or risk not meeting payroll for sizeable population who survive on 
PA salaries.  Whilst the Israelis can safely ignore the US and still collect its 
money (as Netanyahu did, continuing settlement expansion whilst collecting a 
$38 Billion dollar loan guarantee by the outgoing Obama Administration), the 
Palestinians cannot.  Against this backdrop of fundamental imbalance, 
increasing levels of pro-Israeli bias among American mediators might seem 
negligible.  But as Arabs and Palestinians continue their interactions and reach 
the same outcome—that no peace is possible, no American delivery of the 
Israelis will materialize, much less any hope of “driving a wedge” between the 
US and Israel—they are likely to stop trying at some point, and explore 
alternative paradigms to achieve those fundamental rights which this 
dysfunctional biased mediation paradigm has been unable to deliver.  On one 
occasion witnessed in The Palestine Papers, Saeb Erekat deigns to caution 
Obama Administration officials about the continued devaluation of US credibility 
to mediate.  Reflecting the colonial mindset that Palestinians are subjects who 
lack basic agency to form opinions, the US Ambassador snapped back “We 
make the call on our own credibility.”225   
 
3.2 Trump and the Era of the Extremist Mediator 
In 2017, Trump designated the Middle East peace portfolio to a trio of Jewish-
American Zionists well known for their family and religious ties to the State of 
Israel, financial support for settlement construction and uncompromising views 
toward the Arabs.226 In less than one year on the job, there is already ample 
evidence their extreme pro-Israel bias makes them less a “mediator” to this 
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conflict and more an “agent provocateur,” or a third-party whose extreme bias is 
yet again more royal than the king—or, more Israeli than the Israelis.   
 
Regarded as one of the President’s closest confidants in his inner circle, 
Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner’s personal ties with Netanyahu and the 
settler movement cannot be overstated. Through their activism with the 
Chabad-Lubavitch network, Kushner’s Orthodox Jewish family has over the 
years donated millions to Israeli organizations, including “hospitals, schools, 
and other institutions, including …a few in (illegal West Bank) settlements such 
as Beit El.”227 On the eve of his inauguration, Trump reportedly told Kushner, “If 
you can’t produce peace in the Middle East, nobody can.”228 
 
This confidence placed in Kushner is astonishing given his complete lack of 
demonstrated diplomatic expertise, and his absence of experience in 
international conflict mediation.  His sole credentials appear to be his family ties 
to the President of the United States and his family’s lifelong support for the 
State of Israel. 
 
Assisting in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is Jason Greenblatt, given the 
formal title of “Special Representative for International Negotiations.” Originally 
working as Trump’s personal lawyer in the 1990s, Greenblatt rose to become 
the Chief Legal Advisor of the Trump Organization. How Greenblatt’s in-house 
corporate legal skills, however, would transfer toward Arab-Israeli diplomacy 
remains to be seen. Also an Orthodox Jewish-American, Greenblatt, the child of 
Holocaust survivors, has focused on Israel and Jewish-related causes 
throughout his career. In 2015, Greenblatt published Israel for Families: An 
Adventure Guide in 12 Days, a travel guide to the country whose conflict he 
would come to mediate only two years later. His approach to the thorny issues 
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facing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is evidenced by this book’s absence of any 
reference to Palestine or the occupation. 
 
Greenblatt told the right-wing Jerusalem Post in November 2016 how President 
Trump would “not impose peace on the parties” and, regarding the possibility of 
moving the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Greenblatt foreshadowed 
Trump “is going to do it.  He is a man who keeps his word.”229  Equally 
surprising was Greenblatt’s revelation that “Mr. Trump does not view the 
settlements as an obstacle to peace”, undoing, with a single utterance, decades 
of US policy towards the illegal settlements.  
 
In normal circumstances, such damaging policy reversals would be moderated 
by experienced diplomats appointed to the Ambassador’s post. President 
Trump’s appointment of David Friedman, his personal bankruptcy lawyer, 
signals a flouting of such diplomatic rigor. Friedman distinguished himself in a 
career as an attorney at the Bar of New York, defending Israel’s right-wing 
settler community as they continue to breach international law. A lifelong 
attendee at a conservative Orthodox synagogue and son of a prominent Rabbi, 
Friedman served as director of the American Friends of Bet El Institutions, a 
tax-exempt US non-profit that annually funneled millions of US dollars in 
charitable donations to indirectly subsidize the illegal Israeli settlement of Bet El, 
in contravention of US policy since 1967. Friedman has described Israeli 
settlements as “legal” rather than illegal, promised on the campaign trail that a 
Trump Administration would “support Israeli annexation of parts of the West 
Bank,” and called liberal Jews supporting a two-state solution as ““worse than 
                                                        
229 Tovah Lazaroff. “Trump Advisor: ‘West Bank Settlements are not an obstacle 
to peace’”, Jerusalem Post, Published on November 10, 2016, Last Accessed 
on October 18, 2017, http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Trump-advisor-
West-Bank-settlements-are-not-an-obstacle-to-peace-472231. 
See: “US ambassador ‘confident’ Trump will move embassy to Jerusalem,” The 
Times of Israel, Published on: November 16, 2017, Last Accessed on: 
November 16, 2017, http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-ambassador-confident-
trump-will-move-embassy-to-jerusalem/. 
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kapos,” a reference to Jews in World War II concentration camps who were 
assigned by Nazi guards to supervise forced labor and camp administration.”230 
 
Friedman moreover penned a 2016 column for an Israeli newspaper in which 
he called the two-state solution a “scam” and urged to put the negotiations to an 
end.231 Less than one year later, when such views threatened his ability to pass 
Senate confirmation, Friedman sung a new tune, recanting a significant number 
of his former positions. He assured visibly weary US Senators his new belief 
that a two-state solution remained “the best possibility for peace in the region” 
adding his recent epiphany that “settlements may not be helpful” after all.232 
Tennessee Republican Senator Bob Corker even went so far as to claim that 
Friedman was “willing to recant every single strongly held belief that [he’s] 
had.”233 In response, Friedman stated that it would be a “fulfillment of a life’s 
dream… [to strengthen] the bonds between the United States and Israel.”234 
 
The appointments of Kushner, Greenblatt, and Friedman seem to provide all 
the evidence needed of the Trump Administration’s disregard, and perhaps 
even contempt for the Palestinians. The Palestinians, keenly aware of the 
financial and ideological support this American trio have given to illegal Israeli 
settlements, no doubt regard them as potential agent provocateurs (Powell).  
And should they ever come to tabling final status positions on Jerusalem, 
refugees, territory and security, it is probable the Palestinians will find their 
offers unacceptable if not laden with Trojan Horse traps (Wittmer et al.). And the 
                                                        
230 Karen DeYoung.  “Trump Picks a supporter of West Bank settlements for 
ambassador to Israel,” Washington Post, Published on December 15, 2016, 
Last Accessed on October 18, 
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estimated 59% of Israelis who believe in a two-state solution235 have cause for 
concern in Trump’s casting doubt on whether the two-state solution even 
remains an American objective.  This raises the prospect, before negotiations 
have even begun, that the US mediator will be “more royalist than the king” 
(Kydd) by taking pro-settlement and anti-two-state solution positions that polls 
seem to suggest a majority of Israeli and Palestinians prefer.  For the Israelis, 
there is little chance this pro-settler trio will illuminate any misunderstandings by 
gaining superior insights into Palestinians.  If anything, Israelis will find little 
more than a sympathetic sounding board and a public defender.   
 
This also poses new ethical questions over the outcome when the agenda of a 
mediator is clearly something other than peace, at least in any realistic sense.  
Citing Fisher, what does this mean if the pro-Israeli partisans representing the 
United States follow a pattern of allowing or encouraging the process which 
they mediate to be used as a “sham, in which the stronger [Israeli] party 
influences the interaction for its own benefit while the fundamental issues 
remain unaddressed”?236 Citing Touval, if Palestinians can never in a million 
years hope to drive a wedge between the US-Israeli dyad under President 
Trump, why accept this biased mediation to begin with?  
 
For its part, seemingly unaware of the lack of positive results produced by years 
of deploying increasingly pro-Israel negotiators to mediate the conflict, the US 
under the Trump Administration has surpassed its mediating stance as an 
“agent provocateur” and has become what some might consider to be an 
“extremist mediator”.  Indeed, two events in the first week of December 2017 
underscore the very extremes these partisans pursue to try and tilt the legal 
scales of justice in Israel’s favor at the expense of not only Palestinians but 
Muslims worldwide.   
                                                        
235 “Palestinian Support for two-state solution drops, poll finds”, Jerusalem 
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The first came in court documents prepared against Donald Trump’s former 
National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, which revealed how the retired general 
had lied to FBI agents about his role before Trump became president in 
attempting to illegally thwart a December 2016 UN Security Council Resolution 
vote condemning Israeli settlements.  UNSCR 2334 ultimately passed, but 
Flynn’s courting of senior foreign diplomats behind the backs of the Obama 
Administration was discovered and flagged as a possible violation of US federal 
criminal law.  As part of that scandal, numerous press reports indicate that a 
special prosecutor is conducting a criminal investigation into Kushner’s alleged 
role in ordering that illegal interference.237 
 
The second event—Trump’s announcement of his decision to move the US 
Embassy to Jerusalem and recognize it as Israel’s capital—has already proved 
a major historic milestone.238  When Dennis Ross emerged as the lone voice 
internally to advocate for the Jerusalem Embassy move in 2000, I noted in The 
Truth About Camp David how quickly his arguments were dismissed by more 
evenhanded members of the Clinton Administration.239 Nearly two decades 
later, no such firewall exists in a Trump Administration packed with ideologues 
and extremists.  Global consensus opposes Trump’s declaration, a gift made to 
the Netanyahu government without a single Israeli concession and a 
provocation in response to which Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said 
                                                        
237 See Michael D. Shear and Adam Goldman. “Michael Flynn Pleads Guilty to 
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“The U.S. can no longer function as a diplomatic sponsor and mediator.”240  
Kushner, Greenblatt, and Friedman each supported and pushed Trump to 
implement the Jerusalem changes, and rejoiced in its passing.  However long or 
short their White House time may prove, the Trump Administration has already 
well tested the limits of mediator bias and will no doubt leave future academic 
generations much to consider.  
                                                        
240 Jack Khoury and Reuters. “Abbas Rejects Trump’s Jerusalem Speech: U.S. 
Can No Longer Mediate Between Israel and Palestinians” Haaretz, Published 
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